


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19 JUNE 1992



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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19 June 1992

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## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### UMA in Turmoil at Libyan Threat To Withdraw

92AF0881A Algiers EL WATAN in French  
15-16 May 92 p 1

[Commentary by Mohammed Larbi: "UMA in Turmoil"]

[Text] Since 1988 the UMA (Arab Maghreb Union) has been an organization in gestation. Its problems are subjective, and there is not as much interest in it as there once was. So what can we say when the president of the HCE [High State Committee] declares that, "The UMA is in danger of blowing up" after Tripoli threatened to withdraw from it, "unless the countries which belong to it do not show solidarity with Colonel Qadhafi in breaking the embargo imposed on him."

However, Maghrebian solidarity with Libya was quickly expressed when that country was exposed to a new act of Western aggression. President Boudiaf recalled this sympathy before adding, "What could we do?" Or, to be clearer, as he still says, "We have no right to neglect taking into account the balance of forces in the world."

In fact the president is raising a double problem, which the effervescent colonel is far from being unaware of. So why should he make such a threat, which thereby provides evidence of relationships within the UMA and his own vulnerability? It is true that each country belonging to this organization is first of all aware of its own problems and refuses to close its doors on the world abroad. Even when the problem (however real it is) is not stated in these terms, certain people must recall that al-Colonel Qadhafi, who has not provided Maghrebian diplomacy with an opportunity to play its part, has conducted a policy that is difficult to grasp very well.

On the other hand it has been stated that the formation of the UMA made it possible for Libya to break its international isolation. That was proved when Cairo and Tripoli resumed diplomatic relations, allowing Colonel al-Qadhafi to look with more insistence in the direction of his Egyptian neighbor in the hope (which he never hid) of uniting the two countries. This time it is not a sudden change of mood, and the UMA should keep this in mind at a time when at the international—and particularly regional—level the organization is being called on to cancel plans aimed at making it a market rather than a partner. Thus Colonel al-Qadhafi is raising a problem now, knowing that he is far from ignoring the balance of international forces and the UMA's narrow room for maneuver.

### Muslims Welcome King Fahd's Move on al-Aqsa

92AE0385A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
6 May 92 pp 8-11

[Article by Ibrahim 'Awad: "Repair, Renovate al-Aqsa in Jerusalem"]

[Text] The initiative by the Custodian of the Two Holy Places King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, to guarantee the renovation of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, which has sunk into a state of disrepair, received a warm welcome in the hearts of Arabs and Muslims all over the world.

No sooner had the Custodian of the Two Holy Places King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, received the message from the director general of UNESCO, Frederico Major, that the third holy place in Jerusalem needed assistance—the Dome of the Rock was in a state of deterioration that was causing alarm—than he issued instructions to the agencies concerned to quickly send experts and technicians to inspect the Dome of the Rock's present condition and estimate the costs required for repair and renovation. The custodian of the two holy places' initiative is an extension of his glorious efforts to develop God's houses, beginning with the two holy places. UNESCO has sent several delegations to Jerusalem to study and examine Arab and Islamic antiquities, of which the Al-Aqsa Mosque is the foremost. Al-Aqsa has a sacred, spiritual distinction because of its position in Jerusalem, and because it covers the rock that is sacred to all who believe in the revealed religions. This area was the first of the two qiblahs, towards which Muslims pray. In the second year of the Muslim calendar, the Prophet Muhammad was praying in the Bani Salmah Mosque, where this [Koranic] surah was revealed, "And from whatsoever place thou comest, turn thy face towards the Sacred Mosque" [Koran 2:144]. Since that day, Muslims have turned toward the holy Kaaba. However, this change did not lessen the importance of Jerusalem, in which there was the drive to erect Islamic monuments. That was done from the Umayyad period up to the Ottoman Empire. 'Abd-al-Malik Bin-Marwan, the reformist Umayyad Caliph, chose this site to build the mosque, expressing its importance by caring for and defending the holy rock. Some interpreters of the surah, "Glory to God, who did take His servant for a journey by night from the Sacred Mosque to Al-Aqsa Mosque" [Koran 17:1] believe that the Prophet put his foot on this very rock when he ascended to heaven. The mosque—and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem—is unique, a technical and architectural masterpiece, which is still one of the most important cultural accomplishments produced by Arabs and Muslims.

The length of the outside of the octagonal of the Dome of the Rock Mosque, which is within the holy place, measures 30 m, and is 12 m high. Its upper half was covered with mosaics, like the dome, but the mosaic work was replaced by glazed tiles in the time of the Turks. The last stage of renewed building, which can be seen now, was to construct the interior dome of ornamental wood. It had been built of wood draped with gilded copper, but in the 9th century A.D., it was coated with lead.

The Dome of the Rock building, from the inside, stands in the middle of the rock from which the Prophet

ascended. It is a piece of rock that is irregular in form. Under the rock, there is a grotto, that is, a principal place for supererogatory prayers.

The last renovation of the Dome of the Rock was at the end of the 1950s. However, a report by Egyptian engineers, who visited Al-Aqsa mosque recently, reported cracks and damage in the covering of the Dome of the Rock, which was erected more than 1,300 years ago. According to the report, it will require \$10 million for repairs.

However, this accomplishment is in danger, as the UNESCO experts noted in their report: "In the dome, there are holes and some erosion. There is a fear that rain will seep into the art work and into the antiquities inside the mosque." Furthermore, a responsible source in UNESCO told AL-MAJALLAH that this was only likely to occur [because of] the Israeli occupation, which prevents the required maintenance and interest in Al-Aqsa Mosque, the first of the two qiblahs and the third holy place. All evidence confirms that the Israeli authorities intend to inflict maximum damage on this Islamic cultural and religious landmark, in accordance with their policy to Judaize Jerusalem and change the sacred religious symbols for the purpose of changing Jerusalem into a purely Jewish city, in which there would be no trace of Arabism and Islam.

Al-Aqsa Mosque has been a Jewish target since the first hours of the occupation. When the guns were silenced in 1967, the rabbi of the Israeli Army at that time, Rabbi Shlomo Gurin, brought several Zionist Army engineers and surveyors to the courtyard of Al-Aqsa Mosque, and measured its length and width. At that time, Ben Gurion stated: "Now, the kingdom of Israel has captured the Temple Mount!"

"The temple" is what the Jews call Al-Aqsa Mosque. From that moment, the Zionist excavations began under the foundations of the mosque, in the context of a frantic search for any trace of the remains of the Jews' second temple. The Jews say that Al-Aqsa Mosque was built on the rubble of that temple. Contrary to Article 32 of the The Hague Charter, which forbids archaeological digs in occupied territories, the occupation authorities began digging operations under the guise of searching for history, aimed at destroying and eradicating the history of the Arabs and Islam in Jerusalem. Those operations have gone through three stages, whose results have produced cracks in many areas of the mosque and threaten to eliminate and eradicate the Islamic tombs, which encompass the oldest Islamic period in the city and include parts of Islamic lands neighboring on al-Buraq, which the Israelis call the Wailing Wall. This is adjacent to the western wall of Al-Aqsa Mosque and to the Islamic holy place.

Since the series of Israeli authorities' excavations in the Al-Aqsa Mosque area did not produce what they were looking for, i.e., the remains of the second temple, these authorities decided on a network of excavations. These

shook the foundations of the holy mosque, ensuring that the holy mosque would be exposed to cracks after a number of years. However, God did not permit its collapse and, consequently, that is the importance of rescuing and renovating the third holy place, which is being guaranteed by the Custodian of the Two Holy Places King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz.

If the excavations were indirect ways to sabotage and demolish the foundations of the holy mosque and the rock, direct attempts against the holy mosque were repeated more than once during the occupation by Jewish fanatics who were encouraged and supported by some of the ruling Israeli authorities.

Perhaps the ugliest of these attacks that occurred against the holy mosque was the iniquitous attempt made during the last part of August 1969, when Al-Aqsa Mosque was set ablaze. The fire destroyed Salah-al-Din's rostrum in the mosque. In view of the hour in which the fire was set, and the unexpected manner in which it occurred, it was surprising that only a few worshippers and clerics were in the mosque. The blaze gradually spread from the southern side of the mosque and spread, with startling speed, along the carpeting and prayer rugs to the inside of the mosque. The mosque's imam, 'Akramah Sabri, began to extinguish the fire with his robe, calling for God and Muslims' help in extinguishing the fire before it destroyed the third holy mosque and ruined it completely.

All of these factors must have been considered by UNESCO's experts in their report, because they concluded by saying: "The Dome of the Rock is in a state of disrepair, which causes concern." The custodian of the two holy mosques was the first to become aware of the seriousness of this report, directing those agencies concerned to send experts and specialists at once to inspect the Dome of the Rock and estimate the costs required for repair and restoration, in coordination and cooperation with the "Arabiyah" Committee. This is a new committee formed by UNESCO, whose specialty is to safeguard Arab antiquities and culture. Saudi Arabia will disburse the funds required for that, in accordance with the experts' report, following the inspection and estimate.

#### AMF Sets Gulf War Losses at \$800 Billion

92AE0387A Jeddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 2 May 92  
p 13

[Article by Ahmad Rashwan: "Saudi Arabia Gave 70 Percent of Arab Developmental Aid; Inter-Arab Trade 40 Percent of Arab Foreign Trade"]

[Text] The unified Arab economic report issued by the Arab Monetary Fund [AMF] confirmed the negative effects on the Arab world's economies from the Gulf war, caused by Saddam's iniquitous invasion of Kuwait. It referred to the fact that commercial banks had overcome

the effects of the crisis, thanks to the support of monetary institutions and Arab central banks, especially in the Gulf.

In its review of the economic situation's developments, the volume of assistance and inter-Arab trade, and the Arab nations' balance of payments and trade, the report made it clear that in 1990, the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] rendered assistance totalling \$6.35 billion. Saudi Arabia contributed 70 percent of this assistance, followed by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates [UAE].

The unified Arab economic report for 1991, which reviews the importance and prominence of indicators of the Arab nations' economic performance in 1990, stated that the performance of most Arab economies at the end of the eighties was headed in the right direction, because several Arab nations were using proper programs and were implementing them, despite some difficulty. Some were striving to attain domestic and foreign balance in their economies. In fact, these efforts began to bear fruit, as the Arab nations generally made important strides toward placing the necessary importance on improving the Arab citizen's standard of living and quality of life, including ways of preserving the environment and caring for Arab children, as well as matters connected with the Arab woman's role and her contribution to development.

With the beginning of August 1990, attention turned to the crisis that had exploded in the Gulf, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Arab efforts were devoted to dealing with the consequences and negative repercussions of this crisis. As a result of those rapid events, the data available to agencies preparing the report for 1991 was not detailed enough for them to analyze many economic sectors' performance, as is usually done each year. In addition, the negative effects of the Gulf crisis on Arab economies and their sectors was not clear at that time, in terms of statistics from reliable official sources, despite the fact that initial reports were prepared using assumptions and judgements submitted during that period.

#### Effects of Gulf Crisis

The report dealt with the economic effects of the Gulf crisis, indicating that the effects were of far-reaching and long-lasting consequence to Arab economies. Those effects were especially destructive to the economies of Kuwait and Iraq.

The crisis' effects are concentrated on four main aspects: the destruction of installations, institutes, and infrastructure; the dispersal and suffering of many Arab and foreign citizens; the deepening of deficiencies in the Arab economy as a whole; and environmental pollution on a vast scale.

Kuwait suffered almost complete destruction of its infrastructure and oil storage, refining, and export facilities. Economic activities were afflicted with semi-paralysis. With the outbreak of war in early 1991, the scope of destruction increased, to include the burning of Kuwaiti

oil wells, and the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and public installations. There was also a widespread, negative effect on the supply of water, electricity, and sewage facilities, as well as the performance of economic sectors in general.

The crisis also led to a considerable dispersal and emigration of citizens and foreign workers from both Kuwait and Iraq, to neighboring countries and other countries as sources of employment, especially since these emigrants suffered heavy losses of property and lives. They lost their means of livelihood, in addition to being exposed to severe suffering during the war because of the dispersal of their families; the lack of health care; and the loss of educational services because of damage inflicted on schools, institutes, and universities.

The scope of foreign and domestic economic deficiencies went beyond Kuwait and Iraq to several other Arab countries, since some Arab Gulf nations were forced to increase expenditures sharply in order to meet security and defense needs. Moreover, the number of unemployed and those searching for work in certain other Arab countries increased considerably. Tourist revenues dropped, and inter-Arab trade was impeded. In addition, pressures increased on government budgets as a result of increased expenditures to meet the needs of returnees and lessen pressures on public facilities caused by their return. All of that was accompanied by increased shortfalls in foreign payments to affected nations.

The spread of oil slicks, as well as the burning of oil wells in Kuwait by the occupying forces, led to heavy pollution in Kuwait and in neighboring Gulf nations. It is still difficult to know the long-term consequences of that pollution.

In view of the fact that work was still in progress in studying the economic effects of the crisis when this report was prepared, it was difficult to produce an accurate estimate of the total Arab material losses as a result of the crisis. The agencies concerned in the affected Arab nations have not yet completed their evaluations.

Initial estimates indicate that Arab economic losses from the Gulf crisis range from between \$600 billion and \$800 billion.

#### Gross Domestic Product

The 1990 gross domestic product [GDP] for the Arab nations, valued in U.S. dollars at commercial rates, grew 5.6 percent compared with 1989. The biggest part of this growth stems from the increase in the total added value of the [oil] drilling industry in Arab countries, which contributed 20 to 25 percent of the GDP.

However, after taking into consideration the price increases in Arab countries, it is probable that the Arab GDP in fixed prices or true production might have actually suffered a loss in growth rate during 1990, compared with the previous year.

### Agricultural Sector

There was also a modest growth in the agricultural sector of most Arab nations. The average annual growth rate for agricultural production for last year was 2 percent. This is less than the rate of increase in population, which totaled about 3 percent, on the average. Despite efforts made toward developing the agricultural sector, the value of the Arab food gap totaled \$15 billion in 1989, i.e., an increase of 9.7 percent over 1988. Estimates for 1990 indicate that the food gap is as it was, perhaps with a slight improvement.

### Industrial Sector

The industrial sector's share of the Arab nations' GDP is estimated at 30 percent. The oil sector's share (the strategic industry) ranges between 20 and 25 percent of this increase. Consequently, this strength still forms the backbone of the Arab nation's economy. Arab oil production for 1990 increased by 4 percent compared with 1989, reaching 16.6 million barrels daily. The Arab nations' share of world oil production was 25.7 percent.

### Financial and Monetary Developments

With regard to financial and monetary developments, economic adjustment and correction program efforts pursued by most Arab countries during the eighties have begun to bear fruit. The total budget deficit for the Arab nations has been reduced to 6.2 percent of GDP, compared with 6.7 percent in 1989 and 9.6 percent in 1988. That was reflected in rates of local liquidity, which dropped to 8.9 percent in 1990, compared with 9.3 percent in 1989. Commercial banks were able to overcome the effects of the Gulf crisis, thanks to the firm support that they received from monetary institutions and central banks, particularly in the Arab Gulf region, from which considerable bank withdrawals were made because of the crisis.

### Arab Foreign Trade

With regard to Arab foreign trade, Arab exports for 1989, which is the most recent year for which the AMF has official statistics, continued to improve, registering a 25-percent growth. Most of these exports were raw materials, headed by oil. Industrial nations formed the principal market for Arab exports, about 62 percent. On the other hand, Arab nations' imports rose 9 percent during the same period. Food and manufactured goods constituted more than 65 percent of total imports, most of which came from the industrialized nations.

### Inter-Arab Trade

Arab commercial exchange was estimated at 10 percent of total Arab foreign trade, if we exclude petroleum materials (most of which were exported to industrialized nations), capital goods, and food (most of which was imported from industrialized nations). Consequently, inter-Arab trade began to play a significant role in the Arab nations' foreign trade activity.

### Foreign Financial Reserves

Arab nations' official foreign reserves dropped 5.4 percent in 1989, totaling \$37 billion. Despite that, the percentage of reserves covering imports remained excellent in the Arab oil-producing nations, totaling more than 50 percent, or the equivalent of five months of imports. In the other Arab nations, the percentage of reserves covering imports was considered low, ranging between 42 percent and 1.5 percent.

### Arab Debt

Arab debt grew during the same period by 3 percent, totaling \$141 billion. The amount of foreign debt servicing also rose to \$14.2 billion, or 33.4 percent of the value of exports of goods and services.

### Arab Developmental Aid

In his foreword to the report, the AMF's director general discussed Arab developmental assistance. He explained that, in light of the latest data available for this field, the donor Arab nations had given out \$87 billion in developmental aid from 1973 to 1989. This amount included \$48 billion given during the 1980s. The Arab nations receiving assistance obtained 48 percent of the aid during the last decade. The ratio of aid given to gross product of all donor states fluctuated between 3.3 and 1.7 percent. The ratio was about 5 percent for Saudi Arabia. In this regard, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's [OECD] report on international developmental aid for 1991, cited a study that was issued by the International Monetary Fund in late 1991 about the outpouring of financial assistance from Arab nations and Arab regional institutions. It reported that in 1990 alone, the GCC nations gave \$6.3 billion. Saudi Arabia gave about 70 percent of this aid, followed by Kuwait and the UAE, who gave 16 percent and 10 percent, respectively.

It is worth noting that the ratio of Arab nations' aid to GDP in 1973 was 20 times the amount given by the OECD nations collectively. The Arab assistance given between 1973 and 1988 was 10 times the percentage given by all OECD nations. Moreover, Arab aid can generally be described as containing a high degree of bilateral assistance, with a large amount of non-refundable gifts, which are free of conditions stipulating that it must be used for donor nations' imports.

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### 'Arafat on Peace Talks, Settlements

92AE0389A Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in *Arabic* 22 Apr 92  
p 9

[Press Conference held by PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat in Algiers, 19 Apr: "Israel Violates Agreements, UN Resolutions Covertly, Openly;"]

[Text] Abu-'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat], president of the state of Palestine and chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, warned against continuation of the Israeli policy of confiscating land and settling on it, which is forcing negotiations into an impasse because, in this event, "We will have nothing to negotiate about."

Abu-'Ammar said this in a press conference held in the Algerian capital on 19 April, in which he dealt with various important issues. During this conference, he was asked how long Israel would continue to be contentious and continue its crimes and abuses against human rights, and violate UN resolutions and the Geneva Convention, both secretly and openly

In reply to a question at the beginning of his news conference, Abu-'Ammar said: "I would like to take this opportunity to offer once again my sincere appreciation to the Algerian president, government, and people. I also wish to salute my brother, President Boudiaf, for his efforts during the incident which befell me, and for Algeria's efforts—a country of 1.5 million martyrs—in support and assistance to their Palestinian mujahidin brothers. This morning, President Boudiaf once again repeated the Algerian statement: 'We are with Palestine, oppressor or oppressed.' As you know, the Palestinian peace initiative was announced in Algiers. The Palestinian state was announced in Algiers, and the decision about our participation in peace talks was adopted at the last session of the Palestinian National Council last year in Algiers. Therefore, the role, position, and support which we have received here in Algeria are things we are proud of and boast about. It gives us a powerful incentive to continue the Palestinian struggle on all fronts.

"As for Egypt's role and relations with the Palestinian struggle, I would like to take this opportunity to repeat my thanks to President Muhammad Husni Mubarak, who ordered the dispatch of Egyptian aircraft as soon as he heard the news of my airplane crash, as well as for the cooperation of my Libyan brothers, who sent a medical team, as well as Libyan doctors. Perhaps you will recall the Egyptian efforts, even before President Bush's initiative. The Egyptians' '10 points', which was the first practical initiative, was submitted by President Husni Mubarak. It was followed later by Baker's initiative. Egypt's role was prominent in both these initiatives, in addition to Egypt's efforts toward the Palestinian issue as a whole. Perhaps the second visit of the Palestinian negotiating delegation to Cairo in this round, which is going beyond being a training round, can be a political visit that the Palestinian negotiating delegation can make to its brothers. It means that Egypt is sending a political message to Shamir and to the Israeli leaders, who behave insolently, saying that Camp David is a truce, so that the Egyptians can state that Egypt stands with Palestine and with the Palestinian delegation, and that it supports this delegation's positions with all its resources.

"The Israeli statements are not surprising. This Shamir who says: 'I will not withdraw from one inch of Arab or

Palestinian territory.' Why does he send his delegation to peace talks? The peace talks begin on the basis of President Bush's initiative, which states 'land for peace.'

"The world must understand what Shamir means when he says 'the land of Greater Israel and its capital of Jerusalem,' on the map imprinted on Israeli currency, which includes all of Jordan, all of Lebanon, all of Palestine, half of Syria, one-third of Iraq, one-third of Saudi Arabia, and half of the Sinai. This is what Shamir and the Israeli leaders say. They also say: 'Jerusalem is the eternal capital of the State of Israel.' How is this? All UN resolutions refer to withdrawal from Arab and Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem. The latest of these is Resolution 726. It is certainly clear that the Israeli leadership does not want peace, but wants capitulation. They have to realize that no one in this community will capitulate. No child who throws a stone, no negotiator in Washington or Madrid or Moscow. This intifadah will continue, wave after wave, until the Palestinian flag is raised over Jerusalem's walls, minarets, and churches, as the capital of the independent state of Palestine, whether Shamir wants it or not.

"Here, I would like clearly to point out the major powers' double standard in implementing UN resolutions. Israel ignores and rejects all UN resolutions.

"Israel commits daily crimes, including use of chemical shells, and says that they are not tear gas. It has been proven, by obtaining samples and sending them for analysis, that they are chemical shells that cause paralysis or blindness. As a result of these shells, they brought legal action against the American factory, because it is a violation of American law to deliver chemical shells to Israel. Why isn't Israel penalized? Every day, Israel violates the Fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied territories. The demographic change, the geographic change, and the constant crimes against the children and women of Palestine, against the Palestinian people, and against Islamic and Christian holy places, including the continuation of land confiscation and the building of settlements and houses for new Jewish immigrants—all of these crimes violate the Fourth Geneva Convention. Despite that, America does not think that this warrants punishment rebuke.

"The 'USS Liberty' operation, in which the Israeli Air Force, on orders from the Israeli Command, struck that American ship, was exonerated in 1967. No one did anything and no one said anything. There was [Jonathan] Pollard and the Israeli spy scandal against American military secrets, including the sale of Patriot missiles, etc. Any Arab nation that discusses either what happened in the Gulf war, or what happened in Libya, would immediately receive resolutions, and the resolutions would be implemented. [How can there be this] implementation of penalties, while no one can exonerate Israeli crimes? The Israeli spoiled child can do what it wants against the Palestinian people and against the



Arab community. Israel is not held accountable, and it is forbidden for anyone to talk about these matters."

In response to a question about events in Libya, the chairman said: "Everyone was created together, my children! If calamity befalls, do not scatter as individuals. The spears will be resisted if they come together broken. If they are scattered, they will be smashed, every one of them."

"This means that, without Arab unity, we will be eaten one after the other."

In reply to a question about Israeli statements that they would take members of the Palestinian delegation to trial if it were proven that they had met with Yasir Arafat, the chairman said: "I would like to ask you a question. When the Israeli delegation returns, are they asked about whom they should meet with, or about whom they have met with? Why should just the Palestinians have to report about any movement, any meeting, any decision? They must respect the Palestinian delegation. They have the same rights, except that this is a racial distinction, which we completely reject. They do not have the right to conduct business on a lower level with the Palestinian delegation. We reject that completely. This is part of the double standard. Why don't they ask the Israelis who they meet with, tell them how they should do business, or how they should talk?"

The chairman was asked about Israeli procrastination in the negotiations, because of the Israeli elections:

"We will go on 27 [April] with our Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese brothers. We know that this Israeli delegation has no authority, because it represents an interim government. Therefore, we must wait until after the elections to see whom we will face. Despite this, we will go to expose their truth. You all know that the Israelis have fled from the dilemma of peace and discussions, and the dilemma of facing the independent Palestinian delegation for the first time, to retreating to their elections. However, they flee from dilemma to dilemma. I would tell them that no one can hide from the sun with just his fingers. The Palestinian state is coming, with its capital in Jerusalem."

Abu-'Ammar called attention once again to the text of Resolution 181, which was Israel's birth certificate, which said:

1. A Palestinian Arab state, and 2. A (Jewish) state, hereafter called (Israel).

"It is my right to ask: Is this the new world order, or is it a new order for the new world order? [as published]"

In response to a question about Arab solidarity in the talks, the chairman replied: "Is it reasonable for us to go to Moscow and not have prior coordination among the Arab foreign ministers? When we attempted previous coordination in the Morocco meeting of foreign ministers, some Arab ministers rejected this coordination."

Abu-'Ammar warned that, "Unless the Arab community takes a responsible position, the new world order that is now being constructed will be at our expense, and our fate will be just like the results of the Berlin meeting in the last century, when they divided Africa. In this new meeting they would divide the Arab states, [just like] Sykes-Pico, Yalta, and Malta, and no one knows the next one."

Concerning a question about the settlement issue and the construction of settlements, despite the ongoing negotiations:

"The point of the settlements is a basic point for our delegation in the negotiations, because if the confiscation of land continues, which means that the land is being gobbled up, what land will remain for us to reach an agreement on? The Israeli policy is a part of the destructive process that the Israeli leadership is carrying out. I want to ask the conference sponsors: How long will this silence continue over the constant violation of UN resolutions that are clearly against settlements, and against the crimes that Israel is committing, and which forbid it to make demographic and geographic changes in the territories, as is being done by Israel?"

"We have had an official memorandum since the start of the conference. We consider what is going on to be a crime. If it continues, then there is nothing left to negotiate, because they will have swallowed up all the land. Some 65 percent of the West Bank and Gaza has been confiscated in order to establish settlements there, or for military purposes. Have you heard about a road in Gaza that is 250 m wide. Gaza is only five kilometers wide in some areas, but the road is 250 m wide. Despite that, it is as if this enemy doesn't violate international law, and has no one watching out for it and no guardian. They want to impose a *fait accompli*, that is, self-determination for the population, but not for the land. If there is No self-determination for the land, then the population [will be around] just for a very short time. We estimate it as only six months."

"We cite Namibia as an example. Then there are the elections. It is the Palestinian people's right that elections be conducted freely and under international supervision."

## ALGERIA

### FIS Call for Protest Rally Almost 'Ignored'

92AF0805A Paris LE MONDE in French 7 May 92 p 4

[Text] On Tuesday, 5 May, Algerians nearly ignored the slogan "people's protest movement" mentioned in an underground bulletin of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Insignificant events were staged in a few large cities. The presence of law enforcement in sensitive places probably had a great deal to do with the failure of the few attempts to organize street demonstrations.

In Algiers' Bach Djarrah district, a rally of a few dozen supporters of the FIS, rapidly dispersed by police, ended with the burning of two buses. A crowd also gathered near Bab el-Oued, where police deterred a group of fundamentalists who had filtered into the Feth mosque to urge the faithful to demonstrate following prayers. The previous evening, two persons, one a police officer, were killed downtown in a skirmish between Islamists who had holed up in a house and police who came to arrest them.

In the east, merchants in Batna kept their screens drawn out of fear of reprisals and in Constantine, fires were set in university buildings the previous two evenings. The High State Committee (HCE) issued a bulletin stating its "determination to enforce the law to the fullest extent for all authors, accomplices, and instigators" of disturbances. It hailed "the responsible attitude of the people who disavow these isolated criminal acts."

In addition, the FLN [National Liberation Front] asked the courts to cancel the government's decision made the previous evening to take back buildings in its possession, particularly its national headquarters in Algiers. The Political Bureau of the old single party stated in a bulletin Tuesday that it was ready to "cooperate with the government to find suitable solutions" to the dispute, adding that "certain parties are anxious to call this operation a seizure." According to an official committee, the FLN reportedly has 2,292 pieces of property belonging to state or local communities and an auto pool of 2,728 vehicles. (AFP)

#### **FIS Member Acknowledges Influence Over Armed Groups**

92AF0882A Algiers EL WATAN in French  
13 May 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by M.T. Messaoudi: "Revelations by an Islamist Leader: the FIS Is Behind the Attacks"]

[Text] Is the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] directly responsible for establishing armed groups that have now carried out several acts of terrorism?

For many observers this question is a timely one, on the eve of the trial of the principal leaders of the FIS, who have been charged specifically with an "armed conspiracy against the authority of the state." This is particularly true since a statement was made by an FIS member who escaped to the United Kingdom, in which he admitted that his party has a direct influence over the armed groups, which have murdered several security service agents. In an interview published by THE INDEPENDENT, a British daily newspaper, Anwar Haddam (a nephew of a member of the High State Committee) stated: "When we have democracy once again, I can guarantee that these armed groups will stop their attacks." Later in the interview he admitted that, "If there is no dialogue, they will create a situation of violence in Algeria."

There is very little left to the imagination in the views expressed by Haddam, who emphasized that the terrorists, "defend the free choice of the people." He said that he understands their feelings.

The support of the FIS member, who said he had fled the acts of violence, is clear. He said in the interview that, "unlike the IRA, the armed groups in Algeria only target the leaders of the security forces, those who have made problems for our people."

Haddam went so far as to call on foreign countries to interfere in the matter. In his view they should express their opposition to the action of setting aside the people's vote. The views of this university teacher of nuclear science support the view that the FIS is entirely responsible for the establishment of clandestine, armed groups.

This is almost an explicit confirmation that should embarrass the defense of Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadi, as well as five other FIS leaders facing serious charges. They could face severe sentences by the court.

According to certain, reliable information, the establishment of the terrorist cells took place during and after the unlimited, political strike of 25 May 1991, which led to the organization of an insurrectionary movement. The two principal leaders of the FIS, who had been marginalized within the Madjlis Echoura [Advisory Council], decided to use violence, whatever the consequences. They chose to increase the scale of the protest movement, despite the warnings of Hamrouche and Mohammedi, who met them on two occasions in Djenan El-Mithak and in a military security villa in Dely-Ibrahim.

Abassi Madani decided to ignore the warnings of the authorities, who drew his attention to the need to clear public places as the election campaign neared. On the other hand some observers recall the statements made on television by the late Bachir F'Kih in which he threatened to make public evidence and documents which would overwhelmingly affect the defense of Abassi Madani. What serious actions did F'Kih accuse the president of the FIS of having committed? Were these documents the basis which the prosecution referred to in setting out the reasons for the charges against them? Perhaps we will have to wait for the day when the trial begins to learn of the substance of the case against the FIS leaders.

#### **Brahimi on Country's Place in New World Order**

92AF0805B Algiers L'OBSERVATEUR in French 15-21  
Apr 92 pp 6-7

[Interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, head of Algerian diplomacy, by Hicham Kafi; place and date not given: "Algeria: Caution at the Controls"]

[Text] [Kafi] Since the end of the Gulf war, there has been a great deal of talk about a new world order. Can we now see it emerging?

[Brahimi] Briefly and schematically, one can say a new order is now emerging, but there is in fact no new world order as yet. What is certain is that the old order has been profoundly shaken, perhaps destroyed, or at least greatly affected by a number of events that caused a collapse, which itself was followed by a disappearance. A new order is trying to emerge from the ruins of the old one and since it is the Americans who spoke of it, they thus say it is a new American order. There can no longer be any doubt that the Americans were trying to establish their privileged position as the only superpower, but I do not think this new order exists yet. The old order that emerged from Yalta took a long time to become stable, but it actually always remained in the position of what was then called the precarious balance of the cold war. It is much easier to try to describe the old order, but it is not nearly so easy in the case of the new order, which by definition does not yet exist.

[Kafi] What place would Algeria hold in the new order?

[Brahimi] With the disappearance of old certainties from a world having two antagonistic poles, Algeria joined with a number of countries in the middle that rejected such a fate and that sought and worked for the creation of a new order. It will be recalled that this quest for a new international order based on greater parity in economic trade was formulated as early as 1973.

Our action ended in failure and the date can be precisely situated: Cancun in 1982.

[Kafi] What was the cause of that failure?

[Brahimi] Natural selfishness came into play and self-criticism is now essential. We ran into the egotism of the rich countries, on the one hand, and we also did stupid things. Our biggest mistake was probably that our development effort, which in many ways was considerable, nevertheless left a great deal to be desired. The organization of the domestic system in each country and the network of relations between the Southern countries did not develop as effectively as one would have wished. The result is that in 1982, Cancun, which theoretically brought Third World countries together to revive the new order, actually ended up burying the movement. And that was when they began to say that the old order was in the process of disappearing. It was already clear at the time that major upheavals were on the horizon. One can date these changes around the middle of the '80's.

[Kafi] As soon as Gorbachev came to power?

[Brahimi] Not really, because the conditions already existed. One could already see signs of exhaustion in the USSR. One can also say that Afghanistan was a catalyst. Just as the United States got bogged down in Vietnam, the USSR got bogged down in Afghanistan, with the difference that the Soviet spring, which was not as strong as the American one, broke.

[Kafi] Let us get back to Algeria's place.

[Brahimi] Precisely now, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the war in the Gulf and given what is going on in Europe and the United States, particularly insofar as we are concerned, Algeria, while in a transitional situation and like all countries in the world, must absolutely stop in the midst of this confusion and take a look around in order to see where it belongs. Do you know all the capitals of the independent republics? What will Yugoslavia look like in the future?

I think that everywhere in the world, Ministries of Foreign Affairs are in the process of trying to see in which world they are living. It is important, essential work. Defining one's own place is primordial. When the situation changes somewhere, our place necessarily changes even if nothing happens at home. For example, we must review all policy vis-a-vis the republics in the former USSR.

[Kafi] Precisely where will we open embassies?

[Brahimi] That is still under study. We must choose our trading partners, find a way to follow our students, and so on.

Our entire place must be looked at again; our position must be determined.

It is also true that extremely important changes are taking place in our country. There can be no doubt whatsoever that anything affecting the future of Algeria and Algeria's place in the world will be determined at home much more than it will abroad.

That is a platitude from La Palisse. A small country is always tempted to look abroad for the source of its problems as well as their solutions. Furthermore, a small country is always more vulnerable, more affected by what comes from the outside. It can also be helped, but it would be dangerous to rely too much on such a solution.

[Kafi] But specifically today, in which direction are the efforts of Algerian diplomacy headed?

[Brahimi] There is one cardinal principle in diplomacy: Action abroad can only be an extension of what is done at home. It is a truth one often forgets. The other principle is to know the role of a diplomat who must get the maximum in return for the minimum.

In order to do so, one must know the country where one is located very well in order to know at any time how much one can obtain for nothing.

Schematically, one can divide diplomatic action into three zones: a zone where one obtains what one wants for nothing if one knows the country very well. Otherwise, one risks offering something in return for nothing. At the other extreme is a zone demarcated by a red line. One has to know the limit. Otherwise, one risks wasting one's time trying to get something one cannot and at the risk of unleashing crises. In between the two is a grey zone where, with full knowledge, one can obtain get the

maximum for a minimum in exchange. The essential thing is to know the framework very well so as to target action in the partner's country and know one's conditions, whether in the United States or Burkina Faso.

Moreover, all this action depends on what is called the specific weight of each country. That specific weight depends on a number of parameters that are quantifiable and others that are not. What is quantifiable is the geographic position, the size of the territory, the population, potential and effective resources, and so on. Alongside is a plus or the unquantifiable. At one point, Yugoslavia "weighed more" than its effective weight. This is because to an intelligent policy and diplomacy can make a decisive contribution.

[Kafi] Are we now getting closer to the plus?

[Brahimi] Certainly. Without being self-indulgent, even long before independence, Algerian diplomacy had been recognized as active and present, far more than average. They flattered us and told us things that were not so nice because our model of development was promising. Right now, there can be no doubt that the revolution's reservoir of capital has eroded. There has since been a change in generations in many capitals and our model of development also failed, which reduced our capital. Moreover, there can be no doubt that the disturbances which the country has experienced for many years and its economic weakness affected the field of diplomacy and tarnished its aura, its radius. Having said this much, we are capable, with fewer resources, of generating and even defending our image and ideas, particularly since prestige-capital is gradually being replaced by experience-capital.

[Kafi] What can our diplomacy do to attenuate the domestic crisis?

[Brahimi] First of all, we must have a coherent national policy. Foreign policy can only be made within such a policy. We still have to determine our plans, needs, and the image we wish to project.

Steps are already being taken to set up new institutions, to redefine and revive our economy. That being the case, Algerian diplomacy is constantly vigilant in order to try to adapt and ascertain how to serve the plan that is itself being put together.

[Kafi] The Western Mediterranean is said to be the priority of Algerian foreign policy.

[Brahimi] Reality has taught us to adopt a procedure that is more pragmatic than ideological. Without question, there is increased interest in the Western Mediterranean because this region includes both the Maghreb and our main economic partners, without mentioning the factor of emigration. In this region and in a world in the midst of change, one tries to set up a group or instrument of cooperation that will mainly be of an economic nature,

between countries well-integrated into a community, and a group that distinguishes itself from the Arab world and tries to create a union.

[Kafi] How are things going?

[Brahimi] Unfortunately, the matter of Libya is now blocking us, but the meetings held so far in Algiers (5 + 5) or Brussels (5 + 12) have helped us make a great deal of progress. There is also a temptation among some of our partners in the north to keep Libya out of this plan.

[Kafi] What can Algeria do to help Libya in the crisis in which it now finds itself?

[Brahimi] We have made specific proposals. Unfortunately, they were not taken into account, particularly in the North. Last year, the endless shuttling back and forth between Iraq and Kuwait served only to lead both sides into error. Now we are trying more constructive procedures.

We told the Libyans that the situation is serious, that the accusations are precise, and that we must issue appropriate responses; otherwise, they would expose themselves to incalculable consequences. We also told the Westerners that it was totally legitimate to seek the truth concerning inadmissible acts. We must not forget that an Algerian was killed in the UTA plane and many nationalities were affected. We must know the truth and find the guilty parties. We have also said that one does not have the right to expose an entire people having nothing to do with the matter to danger. I told the British that by bombing Tripoli they risked killing dogs and cats, which is inadmissible in their country, in case they did not care about the Libyans. We must not confuse things and take advantage of the situation to settle old accounts. There is also the problem of the law. For example, if Swiss nationals were implicated, their country could not in any case extradite them. If the same problem exists in Libya, we cannot make an abstraction of such problems just because it is Libya. They must be taken into account.

[Kafi] What difference is there between the resolutions of the Security Council and the rulings of the International Court of Justice [ICJ]?

[Brahimi] First of all, the ICJ rules on questions relating to law, while the Security Council involves itself in problems of peace. Many problems may arise. The resolution on Libya is part of the framework of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and all nations belonging to it must comply with it. We are already involved in discussions with our Maghrebian neighbors in order to deal with the situation and see how to help the Libyan people save whatever can be saved.

[Kafi] What role did Algeria play in settling the Malian problem?

[Brahimi] Algeria was the mediator, drafted the texts of the agreement and, naturally, hosted the negotiations.

[Kafi] In what way did the problem of the future of the Sahara affect these negotiations?

[Brahimi] The question of the future of the Sahara was not taken up. The negotiations specifically dealt with a conflict pitting the Central Government against part of the people in northern Mali. One naturally has interests in addition to good-neighbor ties. Therefore, this conflict could have blown up in our faces at any time, either in the form of refugees or even fighting.

[Kafi] Concerning the Western Sahara, why can't the United Nations succeed in organizing the referendum on self-determination?

[Brahimi] It has trouble getting started and global changes have influenced that delay. Now there is the appointment of a new representative of the UN secretary general. Here again, we have told our Moroccan and Saharan brothers that a solution between them was desirable because the fact remains that the problem is a very serious handicap to construction of the Maghreb. It is objectively difficult to move forward on a problem that risks blowing up at any time. As far as we are concerned, we have done what we can do.

[Kafi] And now?

[Brahimi] Actually, we have already managed to get them to agree on the proposed UN referendum. Now we can still work to bring views closer together in order to find a compromise between the two sides.

[Kafi] Are our relations with Iran and the Sudan still as tense?

[Brahimi] First of all, we are very careful before moving in one direction or another. We must not compromise the future and take our relations lightly. As far as the Iranians are concerned, the least we can say is that they were not friendly toward us and they were even told that they had not shown the recognition which our action in their favor deserved for many years. We are asking all media to be extremely careful when dealing with foreign policy issues. It serves no purpose to insult. It is *layadjouz*. Even though the Iranian officials were not gentlemen, we refuse to break off relations as certain parties asked us to do. We recalled our ambassador from Tehran and asked their ambassador to explain our position to the Iranian leaders.

As for the Sudan, we are following events there most carefully. They have enormous problems and we do not want to aggravate them any further. We have heard many stories and much information. We follow it all and tell them in a brotherly fashion that they risk doing far more harm to themselves than they do to others.

### Boudiaf Criticizes Press as 'Too Negative'

92AF0882B Algiers *EL WATAN* in French  
16 May 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Omar Belhoucnet: "Boudiaf and the Algerian Press: a Very Severe Judgment"]

[Text] Another senior Algerian political personality has again criticized the Algerian press. After Ghozali it was the turn of Mohammed Boudiaf, president of the High State Committee (HCE), to express his feelings and views—not at all flattering—regarding a sector that is already subject to the expression of hostile views by a large group of politicians. Boudiaf has just stated very frankly to *LA PRESSE*, a progovernment Tunisian daily newspaper, that the Algerian press is "very negative." The Tunisian newspaper, quoted by AP, the American press agency, reported that Boudiaf said: "In Algeria we have a press that is really very negative, a manipulated press that is subject to the influence of money." APS had not distributed this statement as we went to press.

This analysis and this point of view leave journalists in a situation of total embarrassment. The statement appeared to provide evidence of a serious tendency within a government, which feels very ill at ease at the existence of a free press that has a tone at times rather vivid and perhaps even excessive, bold, and harsh. Boudiaf used terms that go down very badly, because, when he made these statements, it was essentially the independent press that was the objective, in the first place. This is because it certainly does not fit in with the way the new leaders of the country operate.

Before Boudiaf made these statements, other political leaders had made the customary attacks against the press. Among other figures, the leadership of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] had used similar expressions to describe independent newspapers (such as *ALGER REPUBLICAIN*, *LE MATIN*, and *EL WATAN*). They denounced these newspapers to public opinion and asked the people not to read them any longer.

As a statesman, Boudiaf is not unaware of the fact that he decided to include in his political and economic program a move toward democracy and the market economy. Freedom of the press is an unavoidable aspect of this.

Almost all Algerian political groups use the term, "manipulation." It is time to make clear in a concise way what "manipulation" means. In other words, perhaps it is necessary for the people to know who is manipulating whom. At the time of his first appearances on television Boudiaf promised that he would follow a policy of frankness.

Perhaps now is the time to be frank about the press.

"The influence of money." In all democratic countries powerful forms of assistance are provided to the press, specifically to prevent newspapers from becoming involved in problems of money and influence.

This healthy view of things has been obscured in Algeria. All indirect, public assistance to newspapers has been swept away. The new tax system considerably increases costs and leaves very little choice to editors. Perhaps it is time, before the free press and free public opinion disappear, for the state to meet its responsibilities. Since two bombs were recently set in the Maison de la Presse [Press Center] and since we receive death threats every day, the statement made by Boudiaf really does not help things.

#### **Ait Ahmad Attacks Political, Economic Situation**

92AF0821D Algiers *LE SOIR D'ALGERIE* in French  
3 May 92 p 2

[Text] Friday afternoon's meeting of the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) held in the Atlas Room in Algiers to celebrate May Day, international Labor Day, was an opportunity for party leader Hocine Ait Ahmed to discuss the country's political, economic, and social situation at length.

Both the previous speakers and Ait Ahmed himself painted a rather gloomy picture of the situation: despair among young people, unemployment, corruption, the general state of poverty in which most Algerians live, sharp devaluation of the dinar, declining purchasing power of the workers, and a political climate "heavy with threats" to civil peace.

In his speech, the leader of the FFS emphasized the need for very real, far-reaching changes. He spoke out against the political and economic monocacy (ultraliberalism), which in his opinion is emerging and repeated's the FFS' attachment to democracy, a state of law, and respect for human rights.

"Patriotism today means democracy, and the only legitimacy is one which emerges from the ballot box," Ait Ahmed said.

Ait Ahmed's FFS recommends a return to the constitution and the election process. It favors a social market economy, defense of the public sector, and promotion of the private sector.

It calls for a social pact guaranteeing social stability and economic recovery and asks for the institution of an economic and social council that can rally all economic and social partners and guarantee a minimum income.

The leader of the FFS condemned "the campaign of lies" orchestrated against his party since the cancellation of the second ballot of the legislative elections. One by one, he contradicted rumors that have spread throughout the troubled period following the first ballot, particularly those relating to an alliance with the FIS [Islamist Front of Salvation] and his own alleged intention of planning the establishment of a Kabyle Republic with France's aid (a position he says was developed and understood by a member of the HCE [High State Committee] visiting Cairo).

"The new government is now proceeding to reorganize the state set up in 1962." "The fight against fundamentalism is but a pretext," Ait Ahmed said. The FFS leader believes the violence in June was programmed for precisely such a purpose. He condemned "the stifling of political society" and emphasized that the government "is pitting civil society against political society by creating institutions in its pay."

Ait Ahmed spoke out against the continuation of security camps and repression of the Islamic Front of Salvation. "Repression is the best way to radicalize violence," the FFS leader said.

"We condemn any act of violence and terrorism, but we also oppose the continuation of camps where minimum health conditions are not even provided," he said.

"If FIS members make up 15 to 20 percent of those in custody, 100 percent of that group could well become leaders of the movement when they are out," the FFS leaders said.

Finally, Ait Ahmed issued an appeal to make 5 July a day of national reconciliation.

#### **Association Made Between Islamist, 'Afghans'**

92AF0805C Algiers *ALGER REPUBLICAIN* in French  
29 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Fodhil Ourabah: "The Afghan Networks"]

[Text] The trial of the Guemar killers has only just begun and will continue for several more days because of the number of defendants remaining to be heard. Nevertheless, one fact has begun to emerge irrefutably: Afghanistan (and its rear bases in Pakistan) has been no more than a vast training center for waves of Algerian fundamentalists who have gone there as "volunteers for the jihad" [holy war].

Our special envoy to Ouargla, Fodhil Ourabah, guided us on the trail of the "Afghan" terrorist connections.

Messaaoudi Aissa, known as Tayeb "El Afghani" [Tayeb the Afghan], projects a different image from that of the cold, determined leader he probably was. He appears before the judges as a pitiful man with his back against the wall who, by adopting a low profile, seems to be after but one thing: to save his head by attenuating charges brought against him. While Lezzar Amar, the main instigator of the incident who, it should be recalled, took some 20 victims on both sides, chose to defend himself by denying everything, Tayeb "El Afghani" seeks to shift the blame to the dead in order to look innocent himself.

He calls himself the victim of manipulation by Dehane, one of the ringleaders who died at his side during the sweep by law enforcement. He claims to have been dragged along by Dehane in spite of himself during the attack on the border post. He claims he was wrongfully persuaded by Dehane, who said they were to attack a Tunisian border post in order to avenge the death of

Palestinian leader Abu Djihad! When Tayeb "El Afghani" reportedly realized he was being duped, it was too late for him to back out, particularly since Dehane threatened to kill any member of the band who might change his mind.

Dehane's name came up several times during the final sessions of the trial. He was a veteran who joined the international movement known as the Muslim Brothers. Tayeb "El Afghani" categorically denies being a Muslim Brother. He says he belongs to the Salafist movement. He reportedly met Dehane for the first time in a training camp for volunteers from Afghanistan located in Libyan territory. He then allegedly accompanied Dehane to Peshawar, near the Pakistani-Afghan border. Tayeb also claims he spent four months in Peshawar, whence he returned as a result of a nervous disorder.

There, Dehane is said to have been one of the main leaders of the Algerian volunteers in Afghanistan. He was reportedly one of the deputies to "Azem," a Palestinian Muslim Brother who was the leader of Arab volunteers in Afghanistan.

Another defendant, Djidia Zakaria, formerly a volunteer in Afghanistan, says he met Dehane in Peshawar. He was then head of a training camp for Afghan freedom fighters. Specifically, he gave courses in military tactics.

Zakaria spent a year in Afghanistan. He participated in numerous battles, serving on a mortar crew. He went to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia. His plane tickets and traveling expenses were paid for by the Saudis.

Following his return to Algeria, Djidia was contacted by Dehane, who instructed him to make contact with his former volunteers in Afghanistan who had set up camp at Tlemcen and Ouargla. Djidia reportedly acted as Dehane's liaison officer in reactivating "Afghan" networks in Algeria, looking to an armed uprising starting at El Oued and eventually spreading throughout the country, the goal being to set up "the Islamic state." Djidia travels a great deal, particularly to Niger, handling large sums of money. He uses a fake identity card. He is assumed to be a liaison officer for Afghan networks, but is also the main supplier of arms coming from smuggling rings in Niamey and Arlitt in Niger.

The questioning of defendants during the trial demonstrates that Afghan networks comprise one of the main pillars of the strategy of fundamentalist subversion in our country. It is beginning to become apparent that from the very beginning, the movement of Algerian volunteers to that country was more for the purpose of training officers for armed fundamentalist groups in Algeria than it was to participate in the fight in Afghanistan itself.

### 'Trabendo': Impact on Economy Discussed

92AF0742C Algiers *ALGER REPUBLICAIN* in French  
16 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Mohamed Djenane: "Trabendo Mafia"; first paragraph is *ALGER REPUBLICAIN* introduction; original paragraphing not strictly followed]

[Text] It is not given to just any young man to penetrate the "trabendo" [black market] and find a spot for himself in that world. It is no secret to anyone today that the real bosses are the people who have presided over Algeria's destinies. They have taken root in the state apparatuses, and they have used the power they possessed to help themselves. The young men smuggling merchandise in shopping bags and selling ready-to-wear clothing and various items marked "made in..." are only the final links in a what is a genuine organization: the "Mafia" in Italy, the "milieu" in France, "yakuza" in Japan, and "trabendo" in our country.

That organization possesses vast financing resources. During last summer's meeting between the political parties and the government, Sid Ahmed Ghazali estimated that a total of from 150 billion to 180 billion dinars was circulating in the parallel market.

That far exceeds the state budget, which is estimated at 120 billion dinars.

All sectors of the national economy have been invaded by these black marketeers. No branch of the economy has been safe from their tentacles.

Helped on by the state's laxness and favored by the uncontrolled economic liberalism that began in the 1980's, trabendo has managed to grow in a tentacular manner.

The war in Afghanistan was also used to provide more financing for the organization. In the name of jihad [holy war], Algerians were recruited by Islamic fundamentalist organizations and sent to Afghanistan through international networks.

In return, prominent Algerian figures in exile reportedly received the sum of \$10,000 for every Algerian who died fighting.

That money was used to establish a genuine organization and open up other illegal channels. That was how the networks dealing in drugs, weapons, "Taiwan" automobiles, and so on came into being.

Today the whole operation is so well organized that it has been able to set up a securities exchange divided into currency zones throughout the national territory:

In the franc zone are rue de Chartes in Algiers; Tadjenant to Constantine; Boukadir to Chlef; Maghnia; and M'Sila.

The CFA [African Financial Community] franc zone consists of Tamanrasset and Adrar.



The peseta zone consists of Ghazaouet.

The dollar zone consists of Oued Souf.

**Comparison of Banknote Prices on the Official and  
Parallel Markets  
(in dinars)**

Currency/country	Bank price	Trabendo price
1 U.S. dollar	23.23	50
1 British pound	40.63	86
100 Japanese yen	17.59	40
100 German deutsche mark	1,431.59	3,050
1 French franc	4.22	9
1 Saudi riyal	6.20	13
1,000 Italian lire	18.98	40
100 Spanish pesetas	22.54	50
100 CFA francs	8.44	18

#### **Trabendo in Agriculture**

Helped on by the complicity of certain officials, the black marketeers buy up everything put on sale by the state's agricultural offices.

They create shortages by buying and stockpiling seed, fertilizers, pesticides, and so on.

In that situation, farmers are then forced to turn to them for supplies.

Sales contracts or loan contracts are then signed with certain conditions. The farmers wind up turning their harvests over to the black marketeers at "ridiculously low" prices. For instance, a black marketer will pay 2 dinars for a kg of carrots in the field and then sell them on the market for 10 dinars per kg.

On a wide scale, the black marketeers working in the agricultural zones buy up the varied production of an entire region.

With all production in their hands, the black marketeers are able to manage the wholesale market any way they see fit.

#### **Graffiti Said To Reflect Views of Society**

92AF0821A Algiers L'OBSERVATEUR in French  
29 Apr 92 p 30

[Article by Hasmine Sinane: "Graffiti Blues"]

[Text] Walls have ears. They also have the floor when they open a furtive door to the world of pain and all manner of excess. Free of false shame, they are a canvas for the most obscene pearls and political reflections in the form of scribbles that slowly become decipherable. In effect, they provide a generous "shoulder" for all the

world's stories, including the story of rebellious youth at loose ends dreaming about girls, escape, love, or revolution.

Covered with notches and debris, faded by the dog days of summer and rain, these veritable beehives of activity briefly offer the weapons of survival.

Hard, vehement words, drunk with insolence and effrontery, are written on these walls. The life that shines through every word is fleeting, the life of others and one's own. It is a life both dark and rosy, a life of solitude, of the desert one condemns in order better to people it: El-Harrach, Bab-Azzoun, Kouba, Bab El-Oued, Oued-Smar, El-Biar all lend their walls to those whose words stammer out raucous desire: "Wahiba, Sonia, Myriam, my women, my little flowers, I love you so much I am dying of it!"

Any surface is an excuse for writing: Any panel or bridge, the town walls, a door, a bench, the walls of a telephone booth, windows of a bus or late model car absorb in gaudy graphics the outbursts of a youth filled with drama and dreams. Lovers transfixed, Hittites, the rioters of June or October, trabendists, all manner of disillusioned souls sleeping off their zambretto, hearts heavier than their bodies, hoisting the forbidden standard of their revolt on walls already sticky with mud and filth.

Graffiti as a means of democratization? Perhaps, but what is certain is that it reflects a whole network of feelings and ideas difficult to express in any other form. Morals and self-censorship have no place in this public domain. Anonymous or signed, the message, scribbled in haste, is direct or allusive.

Overnight, on the sly, offhand, the burned-out flowers of our hopes are scrawled on the walls, an ephemeral literature that probably inspired such artists as Picasso or Cocteau. Apollinaire would be seduced in turn in his "Calligrammes" by this genre of folk art that was capable, he would later say, of vying, by virtue of the spontaneity of the writing and design, with the beauty of works by professional artists. The works of Giacometti and Dubuffet, whose taste for "primitive art" is well-known, has a certain resemblance with graffiti-laden walls. Archeologists are intensely interested in the graffiti that adorned burial grounds over 3000 years ago at Thebes, capital of ancient Egypt. Linked with history, they remain an unquestionable source of information for the scholar.

That they contain a message for future civilizations, so be it, but every piece of graffiti today is a tale indifferent to the sight it rouses: "Algeria = misery," "Babor Australia, immediately," "Crisis everywhere; in the belly and in the heart!"

It is never a warmed-over message [text illegible] white, whether written in paint or chalk, hastily carved with a knife, key, bottlecap or a broken bottle, graffiti are at one and the same time all alike and totally different by virtue



of one apparently insignificant detail: incorrect spelling and syntax, the emotional charge, the originality of the signature.

In this broad forum of free expression, humorous graffiti receive a poor welcome and have trouble surfacing, with few rare exceptions. Laughter takes a powder when crises are the daily fare. How bizarre! Distrust is preferred but, in the final analysis, statements are marked by candor: "Message to all women: Men are all bastards; I was deceived (...). Be careful! Don't let them do it to you (...)." Roger, but let us nevertheless not be overdramatic!

Scatological or pornographic writings seek protection from indiscreet glances and take refuge in public toilets, a semblance of decency, but we are still far removed from any evolution in mores because, in our collective representation, sexuality is not perceived as normal. Sexual fantasies are still banned.

Since 1988, walls have served as a sounding board for dissent that has burst forth in slogans. Going beyond themselves, people are tired of social and fraternal enlightenment. Writings pointing out sexual or social splits are many: "'No' to women working (...)" ; "No mixing," "They are *tchi-tchi*; we are *la ras el mehna*."

All seditious graffiti are disturbing in the sense that they denote active opposition to the government. Fiercely iconoclastic, the author of seditious graffiti persists in a language often insulting to politicians. The barricades are first erected on building walls, a rebellion with declared insurgents: "Democracy is *kofr* (...)."

Immediately following the first ballot of the 26 December elections, the democrats also use walls to respond to their detractors: "Neither Afghanistan nor Iran nor Sudan (...)" ; "Algeria for the live forces of progress," and so on.

Imperturbable under the street lamps and the favorable omen of a shooting star, the walls patiently gather the thorns of dreams and an avowed passion for other memories. On them people have remade the world, changed men, commemorated a date or an event or, quite simply, drawn attention to one's distress or presence.

Other generations will read our words and, in their turn, shape an inventory of their wounds and joys. Perhaps as soon as tomorrow.

#### Writer of Islamist Book Discusses Censorship

92AF0821B Algiers L'OBSERVATEUR in French  
29 Apr 92 p 28

[Interview with publisher Madi Mustapha by Ghania Khelifi; place and date not given: "Layachi H'mida: Writings Held Hostage"]

[Text] "Algerian Islamists Between the Government and Bullets": Layachi H'mida's book will go down in posterity, not because of the excellent effort it represents in

terms of information and documentation on Algerian Islamists, but because it is the first of its type to be seized since 1988. Its publisher, Madi Mustapha, sociologist turned publisher, cannot imagine the reason for this post-publishing censorship measure. In this interview, he tells us of his apprehensions and questions.

[Khelifi] Could you briefly describe your background for us?

[Madi] In 1991, I took over the family business, a printing works that I named Dar El Hikma. I wanted to get out of printing those "yellowing" old books, always on Islamic subjects, and make an effective contribution to our nation's intellectual production.

My first book was Lakhdar Bouregaa's work, a book I consider very important because of the light it sheds on events such as the Tahar Zbiri attack and accounts on the Boumediene era. Unfortunately, it roused no debate because it was published in Arabic.

[Khelifi] Do you think the book failed to receive media coverage solely because it was written in Arabic?

[Madi] Yes, I think that is true. The theme of the Algerian revolution and the country's recent history is more frequently handled by French-speaking rather than Arabic-speaking writers. One sees a break between these two forms of expression because each one is specialized and sticks to specific areas of thought. That is why the debate between French- and Arabic-speakers, which should focus on linguistic expression, is a false debate. Instead, debate should deal with communication between Algerian intellectuals. My second book, "The Poems of Si Mohand," definitely revealed this linguistic break.

The book, published at the request of university professors, reprints poems in Tamazight written in Arabic characters, along with their translation into Arabic. The work was challenged by everyone: Arabic speakers, Berber speakers, French speakers. It created a dangerous precedent for some, while for others, there could be no question of translating Tamazight into Arabic. I do not think anyone has a monopoly over Berber culture; it belongs to all Algerians. Consequently, everyone should have the possibility of gaining access to it, whatever their customary language.

[Khelifi] Your latest publication seems to confirm the fact that your publications bother people. What is the real story?

[Madi] Indeed, the last book I published, by Layachi H'midi, encountered difficulties. I will first of all situate that book for you. I had launched a collection, "Dafatir sahafia" ("Journalistic Notebooks"), in order to provide journalists with a forum from which they could speak out on the country's social conditions. It allows them to contribute objective information to the sociological knowledge of our nation. It was within that context that Layachi appeared.

[Khelifi] Fine, but why was it seized?

[Madi] I am getting to that. Even now I admit I was not aware of the precise reasons for the seizure. I thought at first that it was because of the title, "Islamists Between 'the Government and Bullets.'" When I think I was going to call it "The Islamists Arrive" ("El islamyoune kadi-moune")! It would have been worse!

Then it was suggested to me that it was probably due to the cover photo, since an issue of the periodical ALAM EL SIYASSA was seized because of the picture of Abassi Madani, but I am not very inclined to believe this. One thing is certain: The book's contents in no way justify its seizure. It is essentially made up of articles published by Layachi H'mida in "Massar Maghribi." There is nothing unusual about it. The only thing new is a biographical study of the principal Islamist leaders from Ben Badis to the present. One must not confuse social phenomena with political programs.

[Khelifi] You nevertheless have ideas about the real reason for the seizure.

[Madi] In the final analysis, it was apparently due to the reprinting of passages from the manual "Civil Disobedience." However, I have received no official explanation from any government organ.

The book was seized in several governorates: Oran, Skikda, Boumerdes, and so on, the last at Bouchene, one of my distributors. Some 1,500 copies total were seized.

[Khelifi] Did you think about doing anything to stop the seizure?

[Madi] No. I absolutely do not want to get involved in court proceedings or anything involving a lawyer and I have not contacted the Ministry of Interior either. I have only talked with the Ministry of Culture. When I informed them of my problem, they replied that they had learned about it from the press and know all the details. They promised to shed light on the situation. The Union of Algerian Writers has also gone after the Ministry of Culture over the seizure. For the time being, I am extremely upset because I had to interrupt the book's translation into French and have suspended the second edition. Let them tell me which passages they object to and I will take them out of the next edition. However, what I deplore the most is the silence of intellectuals and journalists, particularly since Layachi H'mida is one of their own.

[Khelifi] What kind of reactions did you expect?

[Madi] This was the first book seized since 1988 and no one reacted at all. If it had been a book by a French writer, French-speaking intellectuals would have protested and gone into action. Arabic speakers just let it happen; they have always gone along with the system.

[Khelifi] But you yourself are an Arabic-speaking intellectual.

[Madi] Yes, I am, but they do not represent me. It is time for the new generation to express itself. This book was addressed to them; they must learn to speak out. Enough of foreigners writing about our realities such as the Islamist phenomenon. Our future generations will be totally Arabic-speaking and they should be given a frame of reference for Algerian society in their native language.

[Khelifi] Do you truly believe censorship is on its way back?

[Madi] I see the spectre of censorship and it is intolerable to me. We risk going back to the times when books written by Algerians about Algeria and published abroad were banned here. Just remember Harbi's book.

I am against excessive leniency and I do believe in the authority of the state, but I also believe in freedom of expression and creation. Clear rules of play must be established and guidelines are necessary, but with the participation of everyone and in complete transparency. I chose to go into publishing for the purpose of participating in the dissemination of rational, modern thought, for Algerian intellectual production in all its many forms and the translation of universal works in all their richness. That is what Dar El Hikma is.

#### **Authorities Arrest Armed Band, Kill Wanted Criminal**

*LD0606224492 Algiers ENTV Television Network in Arabic 1900 GMT 6 Jun 92*

[Excerpts] The national gendarmerie arrested an armed band of seven between El-Harrach and downtown Algiers. They say they belong to the Armed Islamic Movement [al-Harakah al-Islamiyah al-Musallahah]. [passage omitted]

APS reports that police killed Yazid Farid this afternoon as he pulled his automatic weapon on a group of policemen at Kouba. The police report that Yazid Farid was wanted by the security services on charges of assassinating eight policemen at (Bouzenna) Street, in Lower Casbah; helping to assassinate a police officer at Belcourt quarter and a policeman at Kouba crossroads; and other crimes. Yazid Farid is the son of Tahar Yazid, former director at the Pins Maritime Agency of the External Bank of Algeria, who is sentenced to death on a charge of committing economic crimes and is currently on the run.

#### **Security Forces Make Several Arrests, Seize Weapons**

*LD0206212492 Algiers APS in Arabic 0800 GMT 2 Jun 92*

[Text] Blida, 2 Jun (APS)—Police sources report that Monday's armed clash between state security forces and a group of four men left two dead, while two others managed to escape. Algerian Press Service (APS) reports two dead and one wounded, all from the armed gang.

The same sources report the security forces suffered no injuries. According to information made available to the police, the members of the armed gang who were in a Peugeot car tried to attack several members of the police force who were engaged in ordinary observation tasks in the Boulaid quarter. The police officers returned fire, killing two, while the others managed to flee from police. These sources report that the car recovered later that day by the police is registered to the Auled Aych Municipal People's Council.

The security forces yesterday morning encircled Boulaid quarter following the clash. The situation returned to normal by noon.

Meanwhile, the National Gendarmerie Services arrested 24 persons at Lakhdaria and handed them over to the courts. The court held 18 of them in custody. The Gendarmerie says that detaining these people falls within provisions for pursuing those involved in the recent incidents in the Lakhdaria area.

The National Gendarmerie Services reported the capture Monday of a 23-year-old male named "B Ali" in Klia, Tiapza province. He stands accused of harming state security and belonging to a mutinous terrorist organization.

Security forces in Tlemcen Province recently managed to dismantle an armed group of five people wanted for the 17 March attack on a police guard at Tlemcen University Hospital.

Security forces in Saida province arrested a gang of five people charged with illegal possession of unlicensed hunting rifles and knives. Informed sources say this arrest follows an anonymous tip received by the police in the province. The information said that armed people were hiding in one of the villages in the district of el Hassasna, actually in Touta municipality, 36 miles from the provincial capital. Following this, the security forces quickly went to the site and arrested those who were illegally in possession of the aforementioned weapons. The armed group offered little resistance.

#### **Policeman Wounded in Attack in Tlemcen**

*LD0506091392 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic  
2200 GMT 4 Jun 92*

[Text] Regarding the security situation, two policemen were the victim this morning of a murder attempt in Tlemcen at the hand of armed persons, according to a security source in Tlemcen wilaya.

It added that these two officers were wearing their uniforms and getting ready to leave for home after having finished the night shift. The same source stated that one officer was injured by a shot, while the other managed to open fire and wound an attacker, who escaped. As for the injured policeman, he was taken to Tlemcen hospital, where he received the necessary treatment and his life was saved. The same source confirmed

that the appropriate quarters opened an investigation to ascertain the identity of these people.

#### **More Detainees Released 4 Jun**

*LD0406223592 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic  
2200 GMT 4 Jun 92*

[Excerpts] Confirmed sources from Ouargla stated that 40 detainees were released today from the security center of Said Oukba. The same sources indicated that the released detainees live in Annaba suburbs, and that the Algerian Red Crescent transported them on a special bus to their homes in the province. [passage omitted]

Before the release of this batch, two other batches benefited from the release measure. One included 351 detainees and the second 87 others.

[Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic at 1600 GMT also carries the following report on releases: "Eight detainees from the province Mila were released recently from the Ouargla center. Well-informed sources told APS today that a former mayor of one of Mila's municipalities is among those released."]

#### **Further Detainees Released From Detention Camps**

*LD0706124692 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic  
1200 GMT 7 Jun 92*

[Text] News reports indicated that half of the detainees will be released before the coming 'Id. This report could be confirmed according to the explanation given to us by our correspondent in Bechar.

We learned this morning from an informed source from Bechar wilaya that a number of detainees from Reggane and Bordj Omar Driss detention centers were released.

Regarding Reggane center, the number of detainees released from Bechar wilaya totaled 27 persons; thus only a small number of detainees remain in this center.

As for Bordj Omar Driss detention center, the number of detainees who benefited from the release decision is five persons; there are no detainees left at this center.

#### **Authorities Continue To Release Detainees**

*LD0806181392 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic  
1200 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] The release of more detainees from southern security centers steadily continues. The release is in accordance with an earlier announcement by the Human Rights Monitoring Group that the Higher State Council had undertaken to release big groups of detainees before Sacrifice Day. In this context, it was announced in Reggane that a new batch of detainees have been released, while all detainees at Omar Idriss Center have been released.

**Living With Economic Austerity Described**

92AF0767A Algiers L'OBSERVATEUR in French  
8-14 Apr 92 p 9

[Article by Ghania Khelifi: "Coping With the Short-ages"]

[Text] The market at Hussein-Dey. Two women, with baskets on their arms are rummaging through the garbage cans at the market entrance. One is salvaging vegetables, a wilted lettuce, a few carrots, potatoes. The other is turning over the pile of chicken scraps, looking for gizzards, a wing tip, and giblets that would still be edible. These women are not beggars; they are the first soldiers of the indigenous army. The time has come when Algerians are going to stand in line at the post office to get a symbolic handful of dinars as an aid to poverty. The time has come when Algerians will have nothing left but their eyes to weep with and to admire products they no longer can afford. Economic conditions decidedly undergo strange developments. The days are gone when people were queuing with pocketfuls of crisp bills to buy a refrigerator, a TV set, or even a plot of land. Algerians must now manage their meager resources like acrobats without safety nets. Those, especially the women, who are in charge of the family budget understand that eliminating some expenses and reducing others is the only way to counter inflation. Once again, mothers must deploy all their talents to feed, clothe, and take care of their children. Consumption habits are downscaled whenever possible. Food boils down to "if you can eat it, it's a meal." Housewives' culinary prowess are now restricted to the daily preparation of dry legumes, pasta, and potatoes, trying to make them as palatable as possible. Fish and meat, which were already unaffordable, will become a mere memory. We shall go back to the days when most Algerians ate meat only on the feast of the Aid...or at a rich man's "zerda." Horse meat, long despised, is now much appreciated. The children can at least have that! Fruit, too, may well disappear from the dinner table. Cheaper oranges are consumed in salads, the most expensive varieties being too expensive. A banana or two are bought for the baby, but kiwis and apples from Spain are for the privileged. Dessert, a relatively new custom among Algerians, is already a thing of the past. Yogurt and other dairy products have become aggressive too, although they used to be the dessert of many families. While mothers can hedge with modest menus, some expenses, on the other hand, cannot be reduced. Medical expenses are a heavy burden on the family budget. Unable to save on health-care costs, parents pay without complaining, but that means cutting down on other expenses. For social security members, the impact is dampened more or less, but the others end up giving up medical treatment. The government's deregulation of drug prices may have one positive consequence: reducing self-medication. Another unavoidable expense: clothes. Made locally or imported: same struggle. Children and young people are unwilling to go around with patched-up or threadbare clothes like their parents. True, at their age, their parents were living

under colonialism. Many women solve the clothes problem by wearing a hijab, which they jokingly call their "shabbiness wrapper." These same women no longer go to the hammam; that too has become too expensive. The little pleasures that helped cope with daily life have been eliminated without hesitation. The same is true of travel. Apart from certain businessmen and rich Algerians, traveling is now ruled out, whether at home or abroad. Actually, the very idea of vacations is again becoming a luxury for most wage-earners and other penniless individuals. Yet, there is one trip that is dear to Algerian hearts, hadj and omra. Old working-class men and women will no longer be called hadj, as they were during the past few years. Only notables will have a right to that title...like before.

We are not trying to further discourage workers, but housing and cars are on their way to becoming impossible dreams. The prohibitive prices displayed by future vehicle dealers will ensure that many people remain pedestrians for a long time. Housing? Oh, yes, housing. No comment. On Friday, we shall still be allowed to go see suburban houses mushrooming around Algiers. After being mostly a one-class people until 1962, we are now watching as the gap widens between social classes in Algeria. The rich on one side, the poor on the other. The middle class may well fall into the second category if their purchasing power continues to deteriorate. Unless, through some miracle, oil prices rise again to very high levels, unless work starts again in Algeria, unless the political situation clears up.... But that is asking for too many miracles at once. Therefore, let's us count our money and pray that the price of bread is not raised.

**Report on New Housing; Debt Rescheduling Possible**

LD0906085192 Algiers Radio Algiers Network  
in French 1800 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Excerpt] The one-day information and study seminar organized by the Housing Ministry, and devoted to housing, was marked by the long speech made by the prime minister concerning the theme of the seminar. Mr. Sid Ahmed Ghazali confirmed that 60,000 apartments will be made available by the end of the year.

This, however, was not the only subject tackled. One should particularly note that Mr. Sid Ahmed Ghazali did not rule out the rescheduling of part of our debt. According to him this is an unavoidable possibility in 1993 if Algeria keeps repayment at the same pace to which we devote 75 per cent of our annual revenue. [passage omitted]

**Zeralda Hospital Said Operating Without Oxygen**

92WE0497A Algiers LE SOIR D'ALGERIE in French  
10 May 92 p 5

[Article by Nabila Azzi: "Zeralda: a Hospital Without Oxygen"; first three paragraphs are LE SOIR D'ALGERIE introduction]

[Text] For the past several months Zeralda Hospital has been facing an extremely serious problem: the lack of oxygen.

This precious gas, which is needed for a hospital to function, is in cruelly short supply. This inevitably hampers the normal operation of the different sections of a hospital. Zeralda Hospital has more or less functioned by depending on irregular deliveries of oxygen.

Reportedly, the problem has now been resolved.

Algiers (LE SOIR)—According to the director and several doctors who work there, the lack of oxygen at Zeralda Hospital is reportedly due to the hospital's being dependent on the Hospital of Beni-Messous for financial matters.

In effect, it was the nonpayment of bills to the company, which usually supplied the hospital with oxygen, that caused the shortage. This private company could no longer supply the needs of the hospital because, since it was not being paid, it therefore could not provide oxygen for the hospital. As it is dependent on the budget of the hospital of Beni-Messous, Zeralda Hospital has become dependent on that hospital for its oxygen. The services of surgery and of gynecology have been very seriously affected. Surgical service, which has been supplied in an irregular way, has been forced to put off scheduled operations and to increase charges to those accounts that were not paid.

Surgeons were very often forced to hurry through their operations. A resident physician said: "Without oxygen we will not be able to operate, and an operation may be urgently needed."

The hospital reportedly had no major incidents due to the lack of oxygen. However, that could have happened.

The fact that Zeralda Hospital could not directly manage its own budget remains the principal cause of this problem.

In effect, according to the director of the hospital, direct management of the budget would make it possible to avoid this kind of shortage. He said: "Now we have to wait for budgetary funds to be provided through the hospital of Beni-Messous." And it therefore is difficult for a "small" hospital to function.

In fact the oxygen problem at Zeralda Hospital well illustrates the difficulties facing "small" hospitals in metropolitan Algiers. These hospitals do not have the resources to manage their own affairs properly. This is unfortunate because they could be much more effective. Doctors and nurses have adapted to these difficult, material conditions. They consider this situation uncertain, because the repercussions on sick people could be disastrous. Most of the time they are trying to avoid "catastrophies."

But for how much longer? Will health be a victim of management? The question remains. Meanwhile, we

hope that the hospital and sick people there will no longer suffer from a lack of oxygen.

#### Arrival of Minitel To Give Access to Data Bases

92AF0821C Algiers LE SOIR D'ALGERIE in French  
3 May 92 p 7

[Article by Said Haddana: "Minitel in Algeria Soon?"]

[Text] With just a bit more patience, Algerian university professors will be "hackers" like anyone else and have access to Algerian and foreign data bases. Access to such data banks means being in tune with everything currently happening in science and technology in developed countries. After endless shilly-shallying, the project has entered the execution phase and there is even talk of finalization! Algeria is finally joining the era of computerized communication!

Oran (LE SOIR)—Let us point out in passing that computerized communication is the result of a happy "marriage" between telecommunications and data processing. Computerized communication now makes it possible to get in touch with any data base, even if located thousands of kilometers away from one's own terminal. In developed countries, companies specializing in the dissemination of information are started every day and even talk of bulletin boards. The notorious "36-15's" announced all day long on French television networks are no more than conspicuous, concrete examples of computerized communication's invasion of private life in Europe.

Without going into detail, let us recall that what a data base is is computerized data processing of all political-scientific, social, and legal literature, whether national, regional, or universal.

On a purely technical level, we know that a spoken message is conveyed by a physical connection (telephone cable), analogically. In computerized communications, information is carried by a virtual or digital connection.

Let us state from the start that Algeria lags far behind in this field, even compared with other Maghrebian countries. By way of example, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, and Senegal have such networks. Furthermore, nearly all universities in Egypt and the Gulf are connected with the biggest European research network, EARN (European Academic and Research Network).

The usefulness of such a connection needs no further demonstration, particularly in a country seeking economic, scientific, and cultural autonomy.

One thing is certain: With such a connection, Algerian researchers will be able to get in touch with other scholars anywhere in the world, eventually being able to exchange documents, software, data, messages, and even publications.

On a national level, all research centers, businesses, and universities now have computers and data-processing

equipment, but what is lacking is precisely the possibility of hooking up with one another or foreign bulletin boards. The plan to set up an Algerian network seems attractive to several sectors such as the Ministry of Transport, Air Algeria, the National Statistics Organization, the University, National Information and Economic Development Center, and the Center for Studies and Research on Scientific and Technical Information (CERIST). It is precisely the latter, set up by an order issued 16 March 1985, which is responsible for planning the establishment of a national Scientific and Technical Information Network (IST).

Since its creation, CERIST has been able to acquire a number of data bases specializing in higher education and scientific and technical research. The center has over 20 international data bases such as INIS (specializing in nuclear affairs), INSPEC (mathematics, physics, and electronics), AGRICOLA (agriculture, agricultural economics, rural sociology, and so on), MEDLINE (medicine, biology, biochemistry, pharmacology), IDS (world serial publications), and METTING (announces all congresses and conferences in all disciplines). However, CERIST also has other objectives, none of them unimportant, such as putting together Algerian catalogues, theses defended, periodicals, and other works.

CERIST has been chosen as the focal point for a Maghrebian network, "Maghrebnet," a program linking the different Maghrebian centers and university researchers. The project, launched at the May 1990 General Assembly in Algiers, fits into the framework of an interesting intercontinental data processing program initiated by UNESCO. The program has assumed responsibility for financing communications equipment for the different Maghrebian nations.

Another network of direct interest to Algeria is the RINAF (Regional Informatics Network for Africa) project launched in February 1992.

According to PTT [Posts and Telecommunications] switching officials, the Algerian network project is being finalized. A number of libraries and documentation centers have already set up computer terminal centers while awaiting official launching of the network. We visited such centers when we went to Oran's medical library on Rue Larbi Ben M'hidi. This library already made the news a few years ago when it typed into the MEDLINE data base using the modulation-demodulation (Modem) technique, which enables computers to communicate with one another via telephone using modems. However, the technique was quickly abandoned because such communication is very costly and the speed of transmission very slow. The PTT responsible for the Algerian system adopted the procedure of transmitting data by X25-type packets. This will provide university scholars and industrialists with access to CERIST data bases and foreign public networks such as TRANSPAC and research networks such as EARN. Moreover, TRANSPAC, which sees itself as a conveyer

of information packets, has enjoyed great success elsewhere because of the efficiency of communication, but mainly, the rates charged. Rather than being based on the distance covered, the latter depend on the number of bytes transmitted, ie the volume of information.

As part of the establishment of the Algerian system, CERIST opened a site in the eastern region of the country already last year, with the effective, logistical aid of SIDER [expansion not given] in Annaba. This union of a research center with a national company is quite praiseworthy and should be encouraged by the country's decisionmakers as an example to copy. Moreover, any commercial or industrial enterprise that wants to succeed on what is called the market economy today is "condemned" to hook up with the outside world through such networks. It is a fact, part of the game of acquiring commercial or economic information ahead of one's foreign competitor. In the world of management, businesses throughout the world are increasingly engaged in a race against the clock, endeavoring to acquire the maximum amount of information in the minimum amount of time out of fear of losing markets.

We are indeed a long way from having personal computers at home, but Algerian manufacturers, university professors, and scholars would be wrong not to enjoy the delights of this discipline of the future.

## SAUDI ARABIA

**Nakhlan Said To Lack Adequate Water Supply**  
92AE0395B Jeddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 29 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Mansur Mujalli: "Seventeen Water Tanker Trucks Insufficient To 'Irrigate' Nakhlan"]

[Text] Seven years ago, none of the citizens of Nakhlan village in the district of Jizan would have imagined the day would come when they would be dependent on water tanker trucks for their drinking water. At that time, the village was a green oasis with an abundant supply of fresh water and vegetation everywhere.

Today the situation has reversed as people chase irregular water trucks for a drop of water, while neighboring villages are blessed with a water network that was extended to them from the heart of Nakhlan itself. Things are topsy-turvy. Nakhlan pumps water to neighboring villages, while it suffers from an obvious undersupply as it waits to be included in the water network.

'UKAZ met with a number of villagers regarding this "picture" and reported what they had to say to the branch director of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water in Jizan in the following lines.

**Seventeen Water Tankers Monthly**

At the outset, Ahmad Muhammad Humayli, a district farmer, says: "Al-'Aqaliyah village is only one-half kilometer from Nakhlan, and enjoys water carried underground from Nakhlan. We, however, are dependent on the tankers for water." He added that the Jizan branch of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water provides the district with 17 water tankers every month, which is inadequate to meet all the village's needs. Many people have a limited income and cannot afford the cost of continually buying water.

**Irregular**

Ibrahim Nasir faults the tanker trucks for not coming regularly, saying: "Despite the decision to provide one tanker a month for each family, there is no system for when they arrive. We wait a long time, and then we are forced to buy from tankers every week at a cost to us of 500 [Saudi] riyals monthly."

**Clear Flaw**

Young 'Ali Husayn 'Abdallah says that the water shortage and irregular delivery "disturbs our work, because we are dependent on the water for agriculture and raising livestock."

**Peculiar Matter**

Yahya says with astonishment: "We suffer a water [shortage], while other villages are drawing water from beneath us...I am engaged in raising livestock, and I spend most of my income on water trucks."

**Water Story**

'Ali Hadi Nasir says: "Officials spared no effort to provide us with water by tanker truck, but the problem is that it does not arrive regularly."

Hadi demands that the water network be extended to the village, just as it has to its neighbors, saying: "The water distributed to neighboring villages via the network originates in our ground. Why should it go to others, when we need it so badly?"

Hadi tells the story of water at Nakhlan village as follows: "Seven years ago, we were blessed with water. That was before the project to benefit the neighboring villages was implemented, while Nakhlan went thirsty."

"As a result, Nakhlan began to suffer a water shortage. Officials set out to provide solutions, but they were temporary. Solutions included providing water by tanker, but with the passage of time water no longer arrived at the rate it was supposed to. We sometimes went a long time without water."

Hadi says that the solution, as the people of Nakhlan see it, is to provide a water network as in neighboring villages or to drill additional wells for the villagers to use.

**No Problem**

Upon conveying the content of our meetings with the public to the Jizan district branch director for agriculture and water, Mr. 'Abd-al-Khaliq Hijazi, he responded: "Since I assumed branch duties, water tankers have been reaching Nakhlan village regularly at the rate of 17 tankers per month...We have not had a single complaint this entire year."

**Problems in Usage of al-Bahah Dams**

92AE0395A Jeddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 16 Apr 92 p 19

[Article by Ahmad Hamid al-Ghamidi: "Dotting the I's: Dams in al-Bahah"]

[Text] The Ministry of Agriculture acted correctly in building a series of dams in the al-Bahah region, where they have retained large amounts of water, as at the dams at al-'Aqiq, Wadi Sadr, and elsewhere. Their presence helps prevent the loss of water from seasonal rainfall that used to drain into the sea without benefiting the public. The observation to be made, however, is that all the dams have done is to retain the water so that it can dry up behind them, without being used in the ideal manner the ministry intended when it built them. At the same time, a number, if not all, of these dams fail to be cleaned when empty. Floods carry sand and waste of all sizes to accumulate behind the dams, foul the water, and reduce the volume that can be stored by occupying space.

While there may be an urgent need for more such dams at all ravines carrying water during the rainy season, there is also one to organize their usage and subject them to periodic cleaning.

**TUNISIA****Ali Chebbi Discusses al-Nahdah, FIS**

92AF0641A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 9 Mar 92 p 24-25

[Interview with Tunisian Minister of State for Religious Affairs Ali Chebbi with 'Abdallah Kamal—place and date not given]

[Text] It was the first time that I had heard a different response from an Arab official when I asked him about ways to fight extremism in his country.

The official is Dr. Ali Chebbi, minister of state for Religious Affairs. Extremism there is called the "al-Nahdah Movement." The different answer was extremely simple.

He said: "We fight extremism by hastening development, and we resist terror in the name of Islam by pumping blood into the Tunisian economy's veins."

I took down these words during a dialogue I had with the minister in the Tunisian Embassy during his visit last



week. I had learned that a cooperation agreement in the field of the Islamic call [da'wah] between Egypt and Tunisia will be signed shortly.

[Kamal] Will the governments ally with one another to confront the fundamentalist groups?

[Chebbi] First, I must say that these groups have nothing to do with the fundamentals of the religion, but are extremists hiding behind religion. They are far removed from the Islamic values that call for tolerance, relativity, and pluralism. These people believe only in "absolutism" and the "monopoly of truth."

Second, there is a definite closeness in the views of the two countries on Islamic teaching. The motives and justifications for this are numerous; they are based on the fact that Egypt and Tunisia are the beacons of Sunni teachings that are embodied in the ancient al-Azhar and El Zeitouna universities.

Consequently, Egypt and Tunisia, by virtue of their expertise and historical position, are qualified to play a role in this.

[Kamal] What is this role?

[Chebbi] In fact, this was what I discussed during an important part of the talks I had with Egyptian Minister of Awqaf Dr. Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub. We will be signing a multi-faceted protocol for cooperation in various fields of information and guidance, for rapprochement and conciliation between the program of true religious call, and for holding conferences and exchanging expertise as a means of enhancing this process.

[Kamal] What is the position of the extremist groups now in Tunisia?

[Chebbi] There are extremist groups that call themselves the Islamic al-Nahdah [Movement], whom society has rejected and which has diminished to a great extent, because they have distanced themselves from Islamic teachings and from the Tunisian people's traditions. In the past decade, the movement rode on a strong tide.

[Kamal] Mr. Minister, do you blame former president Bourguiba for the growth of these groups?

[Chebbi] These groups intend to take power by force. They have exploited some of the negative things that occurred in the past decade, but this should not blind to us the fact that the attempt to hide behind the call for preserving the Islamic Arab identity has failed. This is proven by the fact that President Ben Ali made great achievements. Still, they go on committing their crimes.

[Kamal] Is President Ben Ali fighting them with more religious achievements?

[Chebbi] No, these achievements are not a kind of tactic. They are a principle and a strategy that the president is implementing within the framework of a comprehensive

program based on the restoration of Arab identity, democracy, and social development. Those people are bats that hate the light. This project has exposed them, and they have no alternative other fighting with terrorism. During the past four years, their strength has waned.

[Kamal] We have read that the borders between Tunisia and Algeria have been closed in order to prevent what's happening on the other side from spilling over into your country. Is this true?

[Chebbi] This is not true. On the contrary, the number of Algerian brothers in Tunisia has increased in the past few days. Our attitude on what's happening in Algeria is clear. President Ben Ali said that Algeria's experience in struggle [for independence] will certainly enable it to emerge safely from what is happening.

[Kamal] Do you believe that Tunisia will be next, following what the [Islamic] Salvation Front has done in Algeria?

[Chebbi] The situation is different, and I do not think that this is true, because the people realize that those groups exploit religion in order to pounce on the government and to lay their hands on what the simple people have in their pockets.

[Kamal] What do you mean by "lay their hands on what simple people have in their pockets"?

[Chebbi] Exactly as has happened in your country, when some people exploited religion by establishing investment companies. We have people in Tunisia who lay their hands on the alms tax [zakat]. They deceive people and make them pay an alms tax four times a year in order to finance their political objectives.

We have no place for these people. Tunisia today is regarded as an authority in combatting extremism, because it has dealt with this phenomenon in a manner beneficial to everybody.

[Kamal] How?

[Chebbi] By consolidating the constants of Islam and by further entrenching democracy—Tunisia now has seven parties—which calls for pluralism and tolerance. It is also by hastening development. All the world can see this, and this year we realized a 3-percent growth, thus occupying the 30th place among 160 world countries.

[Kamal] What are the religious achievements which you just have talked about so much?

[Chebbi] El Zeitouna University has become a major university. An Islamic studies center has been established. Indeed, one-fourth of the mosques that have been built in Tunisia were built in the new era [i.e., under Ben Ali].

[Kamal] What is the number of these mosques?

[Chebbi] About 4,000 mosques.



[Kamal] How many imams belonging to the al-Nahdah Movement are in these mosques?

[Chebbi] We do not have those. Mosques are God's houses. The state looks after Islamic affairs and appoints the imams. Whoever does otherwise and involves the mosques in matters that have nothing to do with worship is removed from his position. Mosques are not a place for politics. Therefore, any mosque built by a philanthropist is immediately placed under control of the state, which manages its affairs.

[Kamal] Where does an imam who has been removed from his mosque go?

[Chebbi] It is not his private mosque; it is God's house. We often transfer those, who are really a minority, to other jobs. I must say that the imamate is not a job; it is a mission.

[Kamal] We have heard that there are Tunisian individuals who train in the [National] Islamic Front's camps in Khartoum.

[Chebbi] This is true. Some are Tunisians, and others are Algerians and Egyptians. Sudan has become a base for those people. This is a comprehensive strategy. I believe that the intention behind what's happening in Algeria is to spread extremism in the area. But I would say that Tunisia is far from all this, and the immediate reason for this is that we do not allow the formation of religious parties, as has happened in Algeria.

[Kamal] Is your visit to Egypt part of coordination to counter Iranian activities in the area, with Khartoum as the launching pad?

[Chebbi] Our stand is clear. It was the Sunni heritage that taught our people Islam. It is the effective means to consolidate the religion's principles, achieve progress, and eliminate extremism. We realize that these factions that hide behind religion are basically Sunnis, but they employ secret methods of divining [searching for hidden, secret meaning in the revealed texts—al-batiniyah, an Islamic school of thought]. They engage in double talk. That is, they are hypocritical and resort to any means to attack, even if they have to borrow from the Shi'ites' methods.

[Kamal] But the alternative Islamic call put to the people emanates from the state, and you know that some believe that the public does not respond to official Islam.

[Chebbi] These are wrong characterizations. There is no such gap; Islam is one. Its facts are constant and are based on the Koran and the holy sunnah [the prophet's teaching]. We believe that the state must be the one responsible for looking after religious affairs. Characterizing Islam as official or popular conceals a the desire to characterize the society as ignorant [jahiliyah]. We reject this. All we do is look after the interests of Islam. We do not stop anybody from praying, giving alms, or making the hajj.

Also, they speak about the state as if does not exist in society. This is a political mistake. Moreover, the ulema

and the men of religion are distinguished, not by the degree of their religiosity on grounds of their knowledge, but because they are specialists in this matter.

[Kamal] Do you mean that it is a profession?

[Chebbi] No, it is a specialization. There are specialists in chemistry, in plumbing, and in religious sciences. Society needs all these people. Any attempt to separate the state from the religious specialist is like trying to separate the chemistry specialist, the physics specialist, and others.

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

### Investment Figures for 1991, Plans for 1992-93

92AE0388A *Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 23 Apr 92*  
p 3

[Report from Abu Dhabi by Ahmad Muhsin: "Arab Organization for Agricultural Investment and Development Sets Plans for 1992-93; 45.5 Million Dirhams Allocated to Projects in Emirates"]

[Text] The Arab Organization for Agricultural Investment and Development [AOAID] allocated a total of 45.5 million Emirian dirhams to existing and planned projects in the UAE by the end of 1991, according to Dr. Muhammad Khalfan Kharbash, director of the Investments Department of the Ministry of Finance and Industry.

In a statement to AL-BAYAN, he explained that the AOAID has contributed 9.8 million dirhams, or 28 percent, of the 35-million-dirham capital of the al-Rawwabi Dairy Company in Dubbay.

The organization has also committed itself to help finance founding the Emirates Poultry Company by contributing 11.7 million dirhams, or 25 percent, of its total costs of 42 million dirhams. The project targets a production of 3.3 million fryers per year.

The company [as published] has also decided to contribute 13 million dirhams to a planned venture for manufacturing poultry and dairy cow supplies. The project, which has an authorized capital of 100 million dirhams, has already obtained 65 million dirhams

Dr. Kharbash added that the AOAID will make 11 million dirhams available to a date-processing venture in the UAE. The company, about to go into production, will cost 44 million dirhams.

The AOAID had opened a regional bureau in the UAE in 1989 in order to promote its projects, attract needed financing, and identify investment opportunities in countries of the region.

Dr. Kharbash, who attended the sixth meeting of the organization's founders in Tunis on 14 and 15 April, pointed out that the Founders' Council ratified the

organization's investment program for 1992-1993 and approved the 15 million Kuwaiti dinars allocated for it by the board of directors.

He added that, of the projects submitted by the organization's management after the completion of technical and feasibility studies, the board of directors approved a number of Arab worldwide projects. One such project to produce potato seeds in Morocco will cost 4.54 million Kuwaiti dinars, of which the AOAIID will advance 2.27 million dinars, or 50 percent.

It also agreed to contribute 5 percent of the 203,000 Kuwaiti dinars needed to raise the capital for the Syrian Company for the Development of Farm Products in Syria.

The AOAIID, according to a report submitted to the shareholders' council, has completed technical and feasibility studies for other projects, and more studies will be completed under the 1991-1993 investment program. Those include projects to produce hybrid seeds in Sudan, to produce and market bananas in Sudan, to produce vegetables in al-Shariqah in the UAE and in Qatar, to build a network of cold storage facilities in Morocco, to produce and process dairy products in Morocco, to market vegetables in Tunisia, and other projects in the field of grain production.

The report shows that, by the end of 1991, AOAIID investments included 45.4 million Sudanese pounds in the Arab Company for Agricultural Production and Processing, 45.9 million Sudanese pounds in the Arab-Sudanese Company for Oils, 54.3 million Sudanese pounds in the Arab Company for Farming in the Blue Nile, 31.8 million Sudanese pounds in the Kenana sugar project, 7.250 million Iraqi dinars in the Arab Iraqi Dairy Company, 14.7 million Saudi riyals in the Arab Fisheries Company, 1 million Tunisian dinars in al-Murji Animal Husbandry Company, 420,000 Tunisian dinars in Northwest Dairy Company, 9.8 million Emirian dirhams in al-Rabbawi Dairy Ltd., 23.5 Qatari riyals in the Arab-Qatari Vegetable Production Company, and 11.7 million Emirian dirhams in the Arab Poultry and Meat Company.

Subscriptions to new ventures include some 13 million dirhams in the Arab Poultry and Cattle Supply Company in the UAE.

The report adds that the AOAIID had total investments of some 84.4 million Kuwaiti dinars by the end of 1990, or 87 percent of its paid capital of 96.5 million Kuwaiti dinars. Total investments, which include capital subscriptions and loans to affiliated companies, amounted to 43 percent of the shareholder equity of 196.3 million Kuwaiti dinars in 1990.

Organization obligations paid to its affiliated companies in the country of residence (Sudan) amounted to 67.83 million Kuwaiti dinars, or 74 percent of the organization's paid capital. That included 30.6 million dinars in capital subscriptions to those affiliates, in addition to 37.3 million dinars in loans.

Organization investments outside its country of residence amounted to 16.5 million Kuwaiti dinars by the end of 1990. This brings aggregate subscriptions by the AOAIID in affiliates inside and outside the country of residence, and its loans to affiliates within the country of residence [as published] to 84.4 million Kuwaiti dinars.

The AOAIID had net profits of 9.363 million Kuwaiti dinars in 1990, down by 6.7 million dinars from 16 million in 1989. Its return on capital was 9.362 million Kuwaiti dinars in 1990, compared with 16.098 million in the preceding year.

The AOAIID had 131.6 million Kuwaiti dinars in cash, deposits, and investment portfolios in 1990, compared with 136.3 million a year earlier.

It is to be noted that the UAE is one of the organization's main founders and contributes 15 million Kuwaiti dinars to its capital.

## REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

### Al-Asnaj Discusses Party Rivalries

92AE0383A Jeddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic  
2 May 92 p 8

[Article by 'Abdallah al-Asnaj: "Who Is Loser in Game of Musical Chairs?"]

[Text] Recently the two sides, the Socialist Party and the Sanhan tribe, reached an agreement to hold on to power and not to step down under any pretext or any circumstance. They also agreed on putting the right cover on putting the plan into effect (as it seems to them).

Will this fool the sensitive Yemeni people? Will this fool both the long-established and the rising parties? Will Yemeni personalities and tribes fail to understand this game? Will the Muslim Brotherhood and the Reform party (the largest Yemeni party) participate in the government?

Will the long-established Ba'th Party agree to change its participation in the government from secret to open, in exchange for getting more seats?

Are Arab and international conditions right for a trick on democracy? Are there still hidden forces that are eager for power to stay with those that had it before the invasion of Kuwait?

News of the secret agreement between the Sanhan tribe ('Ali Salih) and the Socialist Party ('Ali Salim) leaked out. It stipulated:

1. That they continue to hold all state power and continue to divide seats on the basis of agreements made between them before unity was proclaimed.
2. That both the Sanhan tribe—'Ali Salih—and the Socialist Party—'Ali Salim—still control what had been under their control, civilian or military, before unity, and that the two sides continue to organize and develop

those armed forces that had been under their control, and to train the troops, on the condition that the two phases be merged through the unification of military systems and laws at the hands of Iraqi experts.

3. Oral agreement to end the transitional phase and to announce this along with establishing practical measures. "It is known that the transitional phase is to end in December 1992."

4. Agreement on holding elections, after they had perfected a plan to rig them and ensure that their candidates would win.

5. Agreement that the nationalist parties would get parliamentary seats, ministerial posts, and posts in the provinces and embassies as they are now, and to strengthen the alliance that was reached before unification.

6. Entering into negotiations with the Reform Party (the largest party) to propitiate it with certain ministerial portfolios, bilateral talks, and electoral districts.

7. The Sanhan tribe ('Ali Salih) and the Socialist Party ('Ali Salim) agreed to abolish the presidential council and to be content with a president of the republic and a vice president.

8. They agreed to abolish the Consultative Assembly and set up a house of lords—a senate or an upper house—that would include members of the Consultative Assembly and some prominent personalities that cannot be ignored and of whom they are not sure, on the condition that this council be headed by Shaykh al-Ahmar, chief of one of the largest Yemeni tribes, and an important opposition figure.

9. The two sides agreed that the constitution be amended to fit the new amendment on the form of the presidency and the formation of an upper house, on the condition that there be a referendum on the constitution when elections are held, they having ensured in advance the success of the surgical operation for this new-born system.

We return to the above question: Who is the loser in this game of musical chairs?

Is it the Ba'th Party, a long-established party threatened with division into Syrian and Iraqi camps? However, the Iraqi camp has prevailed over its Syrian brother, for it has a young, strong leadership. The one who leads it is Dr. Qasim Salam, a member of the national leadership in Iraq for about 20 years, who took on the leadership of the party during the Yemeni unification talks four years ago. He obtained lavish assistance from President Saddam for his party, which is still being paid, and he also obtains academic positions and military grants in Iraq, which automatically entices young men, and perhaps their families, to join the Ba'th Party.

This shrewd policy has succeeded in subjugating the two Yemeni armies to Iraqi military experts, education, and systems, and it competes with the head of state, 'Ali Salih, in getting close to the heart of President Saddam.

The latest of the important gains for Yemen was Saddam's directive to Iraqi universities to accept any number of Yemeni students, especially those who had been studying in Saudi Arabia, regardless of their academic scores.

In the blessed month of Ramadan, the Iraqi minister of education paid a visit to Sanaa to hold some talks, which included the subject of the students, as long as the winds in Yemen blow the way of the Ba'th Party. However, the Socialist Party has ways that nobody else has of affecting events and affairs in Yemen. It has a profound influence on the scene, and on the agreement with 'Ali Salih to hold on to the leadership of the army—both Sanhan's wing and the Socialists' wing—and to hold on to effective power and administrative leadership of the civilian apparatus. It is the party that now holds the three constitutional powers—legislative, executive, and judicial—and it began to be threatened with division after the appearance of oil and gas in Hadramawt. This party's experience, plus 'Ali Salih's 13 years of experience in government, do not give any party or tribe a chance to reach power or attain a level of having effective influence on the course of events. The Reform Party comes in second place with regard to social influence, and it has no influence on the country's public policy.

The Nasirist nationalist parties have great influence on youth, intellectuals, and some military men, but their policies are unstable. Sometimes they come close to the Communist Socialist Party, then they wake up fearing for their identity and their nationalist membership, so they run away from it at other times.

Analysts do not discount parties of ulema and those of position, good political thought, broad foreign activity. However their area of influence is limited, and the fear of them is that they are not concerned with propaganda on a racial basis. They include:

The Islamic Right Party [hizb al-haqq] and the Union of Popular Forces Party, which established political personalities that have been deep rooted in Yemeni lineages and society for more than 20 years.

The losing winners will be Lieutenant General 'Ali Salih and the Socialist Party of 'Ali Salim. They are winners [only] because they have saved themselves from falling when they called for unity and brought it about at a time when their kind in the world were falling.

They will save themselves with these plans to stay in power, so that the copious money from oil revenues will pour down upon them. They believe that prosperity will distract their citizens from resentment, and that they will fill mouths with money, and give jobs to the unemployed, and then their opponents will fail, troublemakers

will be placated, the parties will fold, and the tribes will submit to whoever has the money. The importance of freedom and democracy will diminish, and all will turn their attention from words to food, and taking part in seizing the blessings of oil and gas.

So it seems to them! But the question remains: Who are the losers in Sanaa in the game of musical chairs? There are many sides and the atmosphere is charged with expectations. Nobody goes to bed at night without expecting that he will wake up to new circumstances.

## NEPAL

### Government Announces New Citizenship Regulations

*BK2705122392 Hong Kong AFP in English 1057 GMT 27 May 92*

[Text] Kathmandu, May 27 (AFP)—The Nepalese Government has announced new citizenship regulations, apparently to simplify the citizenship distribution procedure in the country, a home ministry official said Wednesday.

A more important role in distributing citizenship has been devolved to the local level and the process of providing naturalisation certificates has also been simplified, the official said.

Under the new arrangement, foreigners who want to obtain Nepali citizenship will be required to apply through chief district officers, although the ministry will retain the right of final approval, the official said, adding that former Nepalese citizens or their descendants would be able to apply after a two-year residency period in Nepal.

Foreign women marrying Nepalis will have to meet a similar requirement, and citizenship fees will be reduced from 1,500 rupees (about 35 dollars) to 500 rupees (about 11.70), the official added.

Observers said the change would be popular in cities and the low-lying, heavily populated areas near the Indian border, and could benefit the ruling Nepali Congress in nationwide local elections starting Thursday.

## SRI LANKA

### DAILY NEWS Reviews Banning of LTTE by India

*BK3005105992 Colombo DAILY NEWS in English 18 May 92 p 6*

[Editorial: "The Banning of the Tigers"]

[Text] India's banning of the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] may well have the beneficial impact of the weight of Indian diplomacy being added to any ongoing effort to persuade those Western countries in which there is a Tiger presence not to permit the maintenance of LTTE offices in their territory and placing other restrictions that can affect the Tigers' propaganda and fund collecting/extorting capability.

In some wide-ranging interview he had granted the Sunday papers, High Commissioner N.N. Jha, India's envoy here has been quoted saying that the ban would not only prevent the LTTE from operating in India, but would also have "international ramifications." The high commissioner has not spelled out what exactly these would be, but with India liberalising her economy and the West interested in getting a piece of action involving

a market that is second only to China's, there is reason to hope that if New Delhi so signals, the Tigers would find the going in some countries less comfortable than at present.

It is to be hoped that India will make those waves that will affect Tigers holed out in lairs in Western Europe and North America particularly. But Colombo must realise that the banning of the LTTE did not come easily to New Delhi despite the unanimous demand for this course of action in India itself in the wake of the mounting evidence of Tiger involvement in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination.

We had occasion last week to comment on a speech that Home Minister S.B. Chavan was supposed to have made at Bidar which suggested that New Delhi was having second thoughts about banning the LTTE. Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit, who was high commissioner here when Indo-Lankan relations plunged to their worst ever depths, had also been quoted in the Indian press saying that India should not be left without "leverage" here in the context of the Premadasa government itself not being averse to negotiating with the Tigers.

In his question and answer interview with one of the Sunday papers, Mr. Jha had said he had read the report quoting his foreign secretary but he had no idea of what exactly had been said. The high commissioner, it appeared, seemed to think that Mr. Dixit may have been misquoted or that what he had really said had been taken out of context.

The interviewer had very pertinently pointed out that the relevant had not been denied by Dixit. The high commissioner's response was the need to check back with the foreign secretary the context in which the remarks had been made, if they had been made at all. "It is very easy to quote things out of context", Mr. Jha has said.

But taken together with Home Minister Chavan's reported speech, it would not be unreasonable for observers to interpret these remarks as a clear indicator that there is an influential school of thought in the Indian foreign policy establishment favouring retaining the efficacy of the LTTE "lever" as a means of protecting or advancing India's interest in Sri Lanka. Indeed, foreign policy makers here should take firm note of that.

The major question that arises in the wake of India bowing to public opinion there and banning the LTTE is whether New Delhi would expect Sri Lanka to follow suit. With her excellent knowledge of the ground situation here, India would know better than any other foreign country, that the armed forces of Sri Lanka is pursuing an unrelenting war against the LTTE.

A formal banning of the LTTE by Colombo will only be a cosmetic gesture. It will not be a magic wand that will make the Tigers disappear. But it will certainly create, or seemingly create, a problem if negotiations were to resume with the LTTE. We are sure that India as much

as we ourselves would wish the present conflict to be ended with the least possible bloodshed. In that sense, the door must always be kept open for negotiations with the Tigers if the LTTE sees the light.

Although India has not asked for Prabhakaran's extradition at the present juncture—"not yet", said High Commissioner Jha in one of the interviews published yesterday—she knows very well that a man who is not in

government custody cannot be extradited by the government. As Mr. Bradman Weerakun put very simply recently, "the problem is to catch the fellow."

From Sri Lanka's point of view, the Indian decision to ban the LTTE is a favourable development. Hopefully, the "international ramifications" mentioned by High Commissioner Jha will follow and India will redouble her efforts at making the going as hot as possible for the Tigers within India itself.

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